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ABSTRACT
Following a century of rapid growth, the global human
population is predicted to crest and then decline in the coming
generations. Some industrialized countries are already
grappling with the economic and societal consequences of
population loss. Others, including the United States, have
only started to realize that decline might arrive on their
doorsteps far sooner than originally anticipated, a prospect
for which policymakers and legal scholars are presently
unprepared.
Global and national demographic change threaten to
cause far-reaching dislocations, and local municipalities, too,
will be asked to reckon with the aftermath. Yet local
governance in the United States has long followed a
dominant vision of population growth, with decline left
stigmatized as a regional anomaly—as a symptom of crisis
rather than a discrete catalyst for it. The growth gospel
prevents local officials from preparing for decline
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preemptively when the resources can still be mustered to
confront shifting demographics and dwindling tax streams.
On the other hand, once a locality enters an era of decline, it
runs headlong into vexing problems of property law.
Underutilized land cannot simply be deleted or removed. It
cannot be exchanged with utilized lands elsewhere in order to
retain density, maintain vibrancy, and consolidate local
infrastructure. As scholars have explored in the context of
climate change, another looming challenge of the coming
century, property law’s traditional preference for
intergenerational stability hinders its utility when preparing
for a changing world. Keeping pace requires that the
institution evolve to become more adaptive and dynamic.
Drawing upon recent property theory, this Article
advocates for a reconfigured tenure form, the callable fee
simple, which can be harnessed to create a new
intergenerational mechanism for population decline: Future
Consolidation Districts, or FCDs. After sketching the
contours of an FCD, the Article explores how one could be
created in a manner that provides flexibility to tackle future
demographic dislocations, overcome implementation and
equity challenges, and comport with existing local
government and property norms, even while pushing the
limits of both. Although today’s demographic forecasts may
ultimately prove inaccurate, existing regimes cannot, and will
not, remain static forever. They should be reconfigured
deliberatively in advance rather than by necessity down the
road.
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INTRODUCTION
A global demographic revolution is underfoot. According
to a widely publicized recent study, the world’s human
population, currently sitting at 7.8 billion people following a
century of breakneck growth, is poised to crest at around 9.7
billion in 2064 and then begin a gradual decline. 1 This
1. See Stein Emil Vollset et al., Fertility, Mortality, Migration, and
Population Scenarios for 195 Countries and Territories from 2017 to 2100: A
Forecasting Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study, 396 LANCET 1285,
1285 (2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736
(20)30677-2/fulltext. Population forecasts are an inexact science, however, and
this study does not offer the final word on future demographic trends. See infra
note 26 and accompanying text. Yet while other studies predict that the global
population will peak later than 2064, slowing growth and declining fertility are
broadly identified as significant trends. See, e.g., Anthony Cilluffo & Neil G. Ruiz,
World’s Population Is Projected to Nearly Stop Growing by the End of the Century,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/
06/17/worlds-population-is-projected-to-nearly-stop-growing-by-the-end-of-thecentury/. The United Nations also predicts stalling growth by the end of the
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forecast offers the latest reminder that humanity faces a
probable future of population shrinkage. Already a number
of countries in Europe and Asia have seen their total fertility
rates fall below replacement level—defined as 2.1 children
born to a woman over her lifetime, the figure necessary to
maintain population stability—and several have begun to
report raw population decreases. 2 In places like Japan,
Greece, Spain, and South Korea, population decline has
assumed the urgency of a national crisis. 3
The United States, too, faces a future of population
decline. Data from the 2020 census shows that the nation
experienced its second-slowest decade of growth since the
census began in 1790, trailing only the Great Depression
years of the 1930s. 4 While the United States is still growing
century. See Rick Gladstone, The Globe Is Going Gray Fast, U.N. Says in New
Forecast, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world
/americas/un-population-aging-forecast.html.
2. Vollset et al., supra note 1, at 1285.
3. See Vollset et al., supra note 1, at 1285, 1290–91 (predicting that Japan
and Spain will see population declines over 50% by 2100, and predicting also that
Greece’s population peaked in 2017 and South Korea’s would peak in 2031); see
also Daniel Moss, South Korea Needs More Babies and Immigrants, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 4, 2021, 5:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-04/
south-korea-s-first-population-decline-has-few-easy-fixes-in-covid-era (regarding
population shrinkage in South Korea); Kwang-Hee Jun, The Transition to SubReplacement Fertility in South Korea: Implications and Prospects for Population
Policy, 3 JAPANESE J. POPULATION 26 (2005), http://www.ipss.go.jp/webjad/WebJournal.files/Population/2005_6/jun.pdf (same); Pavlos Papadopoulos,
Population Decline Tops Greeks’ Concerns, KATHIMERINI ENG. (Oct. 3, 2020, 6:30
PM), https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/250360/population-decline-tops-greek
s-concerns/ (regarding Greece); Graham Keeley, Spain Battles Rural
Depopulation, VOICE OF AM. NEWS (Mar. 18, 2021, 8:11 AM), https://www.voa
news.com/europe/spain-battles-rural-depopulation (regarding Spain); Sasha
Ingber, Japan’s Population Is in Rapid Decline, NPR (Dec. 21, 2018, 4:54 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/21/679103541/japans-population-is-in-rapiddecline (regarding Japan).
4. William H. Frey, Census 2020: First Results Show Near Historically Low
Population Growth and a First-Ever Congressional Seat Loss for California,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/census2020-data-release/; see also Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, U.S.
Population Over Last Decade Grew at Slowest Rate Since 1930s, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/26/us/us-census-numbers.html.
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and has not yet reached the perilous position of countries in
Europe and East Asia, demographic warning signs
nevertheless abound. Birth rates in the U.S. have dropped
perilously. 5 Immigration rates have fallen. 6 Sperm counts in
men have declined. 7 And due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
birth rates have fallen appreciably since 2019. 8 The
5. Rich Mendez, U.S. Birth and Fertility Rates in 2020 Dropped to Another
Record Low, CDC Says, CNBC (May 5, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com
/2021/05/05/us-birth-and-fertility-rates-dropped-to-another-record-low-in-2020cdc-says.html; Stephanie H. Murray, How Low Can America’s Birth Rate Go
Before It’s a Problem?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 9, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://five
thirtyeight.com/features/how-low-can-americas-birth-rate-go-before-its-aproblem/.
6. Anthony Knapp, Net International Migration Projected to Fall to Lowest
Levels This Decade: Net Migration Between the U.S. and Abroad Added 595,000
to National Population Between 2018 and 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 30,
2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/12/net-international-migratio
n-projected-to-fall-lowest-levels-this-decade.html. Even so, immigration is
forecasted as the primary driver of U.S. growth in the coming decades. Abby
Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immi
grants/. While immigration thus can offer a valuable short or medium-term
solution to decline, its role in stemming population decline weakens as
demographic change affects larger numbers of countries. See James Gallagher,
Fertility Rate: “Jaw-Dropping” Global Crash in Children Being Born, BBC NEWS
(July
15,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-53409521.
Without
immigration, the United States would begin losing population after 2035.
William H. Frey, Reducing Immigration Will Not Stop America’s Rising Diversity,
Census Projections Show, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.brook
ings.edu/research/reducing-immigration-will-not-stop-americas-rising-diversitycensus-projections-show/.
7. See Kate Kelland, Sperm Count Dropping in Western World, SCI. AM. (July
26, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sperm-count-dropping-inwestern-world/; Miranda Bryant, Falling Sperm Counts “Threaten Human
Survival,” Expert Warns, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2021, 2:00 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/26/falling-sperm-counts-human-survival.
But see Nathaniel Scharping, Sperm Counts Are on the Decline. Is the Human
Race in Danger?, DISCOVER MAG. (May 1, 2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.discover
magazine.com/health/sperm-counts-are-on-the-decline-is-the-human-race-indanger (questioning the extent of these findings).
8. Compare Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip Levine, The Coming COVID-19
Baby Bust: Update, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/up-front/2020/12/17/the-coming-covid-19-baby-bust-update/, with Sandra
Johnson & Shannon Sabon, Deaths Outnumbered Births in Half of All States
Between 2020 and 2021: New Census Bureau Population Estimates Show COVID-
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pandemic’s impact on demography may ultimately prove
only a temporary one, 9 yet some researchers expect it will
accelerate larger demographic trends that were already
brewing prior to its onset. 10 The Census Bureau predicts that
the United States will have a population of 400 million in
2058, 11 a downward revision of an earlier forecast, asserted
in reports only ten years earlier, that the country would
reach 439 million people by 2050. 12 Now it is predicted that
the U.S. population will peak in 2062 and then enter a stage
of decline. 13 If the projection proves true, a majority of the
Americans who must confront decline in the 2060s are
already alive today. 14
19 Impact on Fertility and Mortality Across the Nation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Mar. 24, 2022) https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/03/deaths-outnum
bered-births-in-half-of-states-between-2020-and-2021.html.
9. Moss, supra note 3 (discussing the challenges of stemming population
decline in the context of the pandemic); Conor Dougherty, The Californians Are
Coming. So Is Their Housing Crisis., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2021/02/12/business/economy/california-housing-crisis.html (discussing
population shifts exacerbated by the pandemic).
10. See Philip N. Cohen, Baby Bust: Falling Fertility in US Counties Is
Associated with COVID-19 Prevalence and Mobility Reductions 2–4 (July 4,
2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/qwxz3/; Daniel
Griswold, More Immigration Needed to Offset COVID-19 and America’s
Demographic Decline, MERCATUS CTR. (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.mercatus.org/
publications/trade-and-immigration/more-immigration-needed-offset-covid-19and-america%E2%80%99s-demographic (noting that “the COVID-19 pandemic
has accelerated certain demographic trends that were already heading in a
worrisome direction”); Courtney Vinopal, The U.S. Birth Rate Began Dropping
Years Before the Pandemic. Here’s Why, PBS (May 13, 2021, 1:24 PM), https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-the-coronavirus-pandemic-has-changed-theway-americans-think-about-pregnancy.
11. JONATHAN VESPA, DAVID M. ARMSTRONG & LAUREN MEDINA, U.S. DEP’T OF
COM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TURNING POINTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES: POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR 2020 TO 2060, at 2 (Feb. 2020),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.html.
12. See Grayson K. Vincent & Victoria A. Velkoff, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 TO 2050, at
10 (2010), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2010
/demo/p25-1138.pdf.
13. Vollset et al., supra note 1, at 1291.
14. The Census Bureau projects that the median age of the U.S. population
will be 43 in 2060, indicating that over 200 million Americans in 2060 have
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The magnitude of this slow-developing crisis has escaped
the attention of legal scholars. While climate scholars have
urged us to prepare for the Anthropocene Era, a dawning age
where humans exert consequential control over nature, 15
there have been few calls to prepare for the demographic
changes borne out by a different form of human influence:
the control we exert over reproductive biology. 16 In
particular, decline threatens the stability of two legal
institutions that are fundamentally grounded in anathema
concepts: local government law, driven by visions of growth
and development; and property law, which anticipates and
endorses long-term stability and static norms. Both
institutions are woefully unprepared for a future of decline.
This Article aims to shed light upon the problem before
the prospect and ramifications of population decline become
more pronounced. It first offers a critique of existing local
government and property law regimes. Then, drawing and
building upon recent property scholarship, it proposes an
intergenerational mechanism for reconfiguring local
property in advance of accelerated demographic change.
Part I introduces the concept of population decline, first
as a matter of demographic theory and intergenerational
law, and second in the context of its prickly relationship with
local governance. This Part demonstrates how local decline
has been viewed by stakeholders and scholars as a symptom
of socioeconomic ills, not as a discrete demographic
already been born. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Older People
Projected to Outnumber Children for First Time in U.S. History (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/cb18-41-population-proje
ctions.html. But because population growth in the coming decades will rely
disproportionately on immigration, see Budiman, supra note 6, many of these
future Americans are not yet citizens today.
15. See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
16. Relatedly, though, property scholars have recently begun to approach the
broader role of present and future demographic change in shaping property
regimes. See, e.g., Michael C. Pollack & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Property Law for
the Ages, 63 WM. & MARY L. REV. 561, 564–65 (2021) (advocating for property
reforms in areas that impact senior citizens, assessed against the forecast of an
aging population over the coming 40 years).
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possibility, thus sowing an environment where the political
mandate to confront decline emerges too late to muster the
resources necessary to confront it.
Part II examines the central role played by property law
in facilitating these cycles of local decline—and at the same
time, the role property is capable of playing in preparing for
future dislocations. Whereas traditional property law is
characterized by a tension between stability and
adaptability, this Part concludes by considering a new tenure
form, the callable fee simple, that aims to balance these
competing tensions in a manner that promotes
intergenerational utility. Building upon the callable fee
model, Part III then proposes a new tool for local property
law: the Future Contraction Districts (FCDs). Creating
FCDs could permit adaptive and unified responses to
population decline in the future, encourage a recalibrated
perspective on local property and growth today, and facilitate
new market behavior and land use opportunities in the
meantime, even if, ultimately, population decline never
comes to pass. This Part argues that local officials should use
zoning reform as an opportune gateway for implementing
FCDs and preparing in a limited yet meaningful fashion for
the challenges likely to emerge in coming generations.
The Article concludes by emphasizing the impermanence
and unpredictability of existing systems. No locality will
truly grow forever, notwithstanding that the operative model
of local governance assumes otherwise, and no private
property right is truly everlasting, even if property law is
facially built around the foundational concept of long-term
stability. Predictions of future trends are necessarily clouded
in uncertainty. But even if coming decades do not produce
the demographic shifts currently feared, infusing
intergenerational adaptability into local property law still
offers flexibility for future public stewards and also a refined
approach to growth and decline for those making land use
decisions today.
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LOCATING POPULATION DECLINE

Grappling with the prospect of future population
shrinkage demands, as a starting point, an assessment of
how decline operates in national and subnational
frameworks. When do national demographic shifts occur,
and why? How does decline manifest in local governance
theory and the local government lifecycle? And how have
legal scholars addressed the intergenerational questions the
issue tends to raise? Some of these questions are relatively
novel, raised in recent years by scholars confronting a new,
uncertain century likely to be marred by climate change.
Others reflect age-old cycles of human expansion and
contraction. For localities, however, past experience may
prove a poor tonic for addressing population loss because
demographic shifts that were once local or regional in
character now stand to play out at the national level—albeit
still with a local twist.
A. Decline in Policy and Law
National population decline is a recognized feature of
demographic transition, a theory that describes how
countries experience falling birthrates as they undergo
economic and social development. 17 The theory is
traditionally explained through a four-stage lifecycle. In the
first stage, a pre-industrial or low-income country displays
both high birth rates and high death rates, a product of
underdeveloped medical and public health systems. 18
Population growth remains low until the second stage, when

17. The theory was formally articulated by Frank W. Notestein in the 1940s
and 1950s. See ROBERT WOODS, THE DEMOGRAPHY OF VICTORIAN ENGLAND AND
WALES 18 (2000).
18. See Richard Knight, Can We Be Sure the World’s Population Will Stop
Rising?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology19923200; John Bongaarts, Human Population Growth and the Demographic
Transition, 364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCIS. 2985, 2985
(2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2781829/.
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the country experiences an economic transformation—
traditionally from an agrarian to an industrial society 19—
and its death rate declines even as its birth rates remain
high, contributing to a rapid demographic change signified
by a high rate of population growth. 20 Growth then slows at
stage three, as birth rates now begin to fall, and eventually
a country finds itself at stage four, where both birth and
death rates remain low and the population flatlines or even
begins to decline. 21 Demographers debate what comes next.
While some argue that continued economic and social
development may usher in a “stage five” where fertility rates
again begin to rise, 22 other studies have pushed back on this
theory, pointing to national-level data indicating that latestage societies are still characterized by decline, not by
growth. 23
A prediction of population decline in the United States
thus fits squarely with the traditional view of demographic
change in high-income countries. At the same time, however,
ongoing debates between social scientists indicate that longterm demographic forecasts should be approached with a
degree of caution. The familial and cultural forces that have
shaped the childbearing decisions of recent generations
might change in the future. Women’s rights and access to
birth control may be rolled back. 24 Governmental
19. Bongaarts, supra note 18, at 2985.
20. See id.; Knight, supra note 18.
21. For an analysis of theories underpinning fertility decline in the later
stages of demographic transition, see Oded Galor, The Demographic Transition:
Causes and Consequences, 6 CLIOMETRICA 1 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4116081/pdf/nihms-526936.pdf.
22. See Mikko Myrskylä, Hans-Peter Kohler & Francesco C. Billari, Advances
in Development Reverse Fertility Declines, 460 NATURE 741, 743 (2009).
23. See Hampton Gray Gaddy, A Decade of TFR Declines Suggests No
Relationship Between Development and Sub-Replacement Fertility Rebounds, 44
DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH. 125, 125 (2021); see also Ron Lesthaeghe, The Second
Demographic Transition: A Concise Overview of its Development, 111 PNAS
18,112, 18,112 (2014) (discussing the second demographic transition).
24. See Christopher Murray, Dir., Inst. for Health Metrics and Evaluation,
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interventions to stem population decline, thus far ineffective,
may someday bear fruit. 25 And two forces that already
shadow the arc of the twenty-first century—climate change
and automation—may create unanticipated societal
dislocations. The effects of transformational variables are, by
definition, difficult to predict, underscoring the hesitance
that accompanies demographic predictions. 26 Readers of this
Article in forty years, if any, may well scoff at the prophecies
it cites.
But the challenge of predicting the future should not
stymie efforts to confront it today. Newly updated forecasts
and accelerated demographic trends suggest there is a strong
probability the United States will face population decline in
the coming generations. So too does the realized arrival of
decline in other high-income countries, many of which are
only now scrambling to address its impacts. 27 It behooves
policymakers and scholars to think soberly about the various
Speaker at Council on Foreign Relations Meeting (July 15, 2020) (discussing the
threat to female reproductive rights in the context of demographic change), in
The Emptying Planet: The Global Impact of Declining Fertility Rates, A Virtual
Roundtable, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/event/emptyingplanet-global-impact-declining-fertility-rates-virtual-roundtable.
25. See id. (discussing a moderately successful intervention in Sweden, as
contrasted against interventions in Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan); Gallagher,
supra note 6 (also contrasting Sweden against other countries); Noriko O. Tsuya,
Low Fertility in Japan—No End in Sight, ASIAPACIFIC ISSUES, no. 131, June 2017,
at 1, 3–4, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/low-fertility-in-japan%E2
%80%94no-end-in-sight (regarding interventions in Japan).
26. See, e.g., Brian Thiede, Climate Change Will Likely Influence Fertility
Rates, NEW SEC. BEAT (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/
2019/09/climate-change-influence-fertility-rates/ (discussing the varied ways
climate change could affect fertility).
27. Spain, for example, implemented a national initiative to confront
demographic change in 2017, despite the United Nations predicting in 2000 that
Spain would see significant population decline by 2050 and have the highest
percentage of elderly people in the world. See MINISTERIO DE POLÍTICA
TERRITORIAL Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA, ESTRATEGIA NACIONAL FRENTE AL RETO
DEMOGRÁFICO [MINISTRY OF POLITICAL TERRITORY & PUBLIC FUNCTION, NATIONAL
STRATEGY TO COMBAT THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE] (2017), https://www.mptfp
.gob.es/dam/es/portal/reto_demografico/Estrategia_Nacional/directrices_general
es_estrategia.pdf (in Spanish); Xavier Bosch, Spain Faces Massive Decline in
Population, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 891, 891 (2000).
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institutions that will be disrupted by demographic change.
To be sure, the causes and effects of these disruptions cut
both ways. In some respects decline is a trend to celebrate.
Revolutions in public health and women’s rights over the
past century have reduced childhood mortality, created and
expanded access to contraception and education, and made
the workforce more egalitarian, even as once-rigid gender
roles associated with raising children have slowly begun to
erode. 28 As an effect of these revolutions, women in many
countries are able to genuinely choose how many children
they wish to have, if any—a sea change in the global
movement for reproductive rights. 29 Population decline can
also be celebrated as a matter of environmental health. With
shrinking populations, the pace of global resource
exploitation and environmental denigration may slow,
reducing, to a degree, the natural disasters and
humanitarian crises caused by climate change.
Yet these appreciable silver linings should not obscure
that decline is also a cause for alarm. Systematic population
loss threatens significant societal dislocations. Decline
challenges bedrock institutions rooted in the gospel of
growth: the labor and stock market; pensions and social
safety nets; tax revenues and national debt. 30 When
28. See Vollset et al., supra note 1 (noting these as factors in population
decline).
29. Jedediah Purdy, The New Biopolitics, DEMOCRACY, no. 1, Summer 2006,
at 6, 7, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/1/the-new-biopolitics/ (discussing
the choice not to have children as a dominant driver in population decline). But
see Lyman Stone, How Many Kids Do Women Want?, INST. FOR FAM. STUD. (June
1, 2018), https://ifstudies.org/blog/how-many-kids-do-women-want (discussing
the gap between desired and actual birthrates).
30. See Tim Jackson, The Post-Growth Challenge: Secular Stagnation,
Inequality and the Limits to Growth 2 (Ctr. for Understanding of Sustainable
Prosperity, Working Paper No. 12, 2018), https://www.cusp.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/WP-12-The-Post-Growth-Challenge-1.2MB.pdf (discussing the dominant
“growth fetish” and noting that “[t]he pursuit of economic growth has been a
defining feature of the global economy for well over half a century;” the paper
advocates for a “post-growth” “new normal”); see also Juan F. Jimeno, Fewer
Babies and More Robots: Economic Growth in a New Era of Demographic and
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populations fall, there are necessarily fewer people to
educate, employ, and turn into consumers. 31 There are fewer
people to pay taxes, finance healthcare costs for an aging
population, and provide those healthcare services. 32 National
economies are presently unprepared to grapple with the
multivariate consequences of decline. 33 In this manner, the
demographic transition can be likened to other societal
dislocations threatened by the Anthropocene Era, most
notably the risks posed by climate change. As with climate
change, the scale and scope of prospective population loss
may appear overwhelming and difficult to conceptualize
from our present viewpoint. As with climate change, then,
Technological Changes, 10 SERIES 93, 96–97
macroeconomic implications of population decline).

(2019)

(discussing

the

31. Economists have explored and debated how slowing population growth
may contribute to the concept of secular stagflation, where growth and
productivity slow while prices rise. See CHARLES GOODHART & MANOJ PRADHAN,
THE GREAT DEMOGRAPHIC REVERSAL: AGEING SOCIETIES, WANING INEQUALITY, AND
AN INFLATION REVIVAL 119, 204 (2020).
32. See, e.g., Lele Li, Tiantian Du & Yanping Hu, The Effect of Population
Aging on Healthcare Expenditure from a Healthcare Demand Perspective Among
Different Age Groups: Evidence from Beijing City in the People’s Republic of
China, 13 RISK MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 1403, 1408–09 (2020); The Growing
Cost of Aging in America Part 1: An Aging Population and Rising Health Care
Costs, MILKEN INST. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH GEO. WASH. UNIV. (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://onlinepublichealth.gwu.edu/resources/cost-of-aging-healthcare/. But see
Ludwig Dittrich & Dana Stara, The Impact of Aging Population on the Rise of the
Health Care Cost in the Czech Republic, 19 INT’L ADVANCES ECON. RSCH. 11, 11,
16 (2013) (assessing literature questioning the role demographic change plays in
rising health care costs).
33. Romania, for example, has seen a declining population since 1990, which
has depleted tax revenues and weakened national health and social security
systems, causing further economic challenges and continued emigration. See
Cristian Gherasim, Romania’s Population to Drop Significantly in the Next
Decades, EU REP. (May 14, 2021), https://www.eureporter.co/world/romania/2021
/05/14/romanias-population-to-drop-significantly-in-the-next-decades/;
Sorin
Melenciuc, Romania’s Demographic Decline Speeds Up This Year on Fewer
Births, BUS. REV. (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:23 AM), https://business-review.eu/business/
romanias-demographic-decline-speeds-up-this-year-on-fewer-births-199431;
Eugen Tomiuc, Romania: Poverty Compounds Population Drop (Part 4), RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 19, 2001, 12:00 AM), https://www.rferl.org/a
/1097762.html. In this manner, cycles of national decline can mirror those seen
at the local level. See infra Section I.B.
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the demographic transition calls for an approach that is both
wide-ranging in scope and proactive in nature. 34
Climate change also offers a legal blueprint for
population decline. In response to the accelerating crisis
posed by global climate change, a number of scholars have
challenged the existing legal paradigm, arguing that the law
must evolve and become more adaptive—and in doing so,
must look decades and even centuries into the future to
prepare for an era increasingly characterized by
environmental upheaval. 35 In an era defined by a changing
climate, per this reasoning, legal systems can no longer
operate based upon static assumptions and past experiences;
rather, they must experiment and nimbly look ahead. 36
Climate scholars have framed their call for proactive
34. In the terminology of climate change scholarship, commentators have
called for reforms in environmental law and other legal regimes that embrace
both forward-looking mitigation and adaptation strategies. See, e.g., Robin
Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 9, 18–30 (2010);
James E. Parker-Flynn, The Intersection of Mitigation and Adaptation in Climate
Law and Policy, 38 ENVIRONS ENV’T L. & POL’Y J. 1, 40–46 (2014).
35. See, e.g., ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 242 (2010); Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster
Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, 23 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 23, 24
(2012); Yee Huang et al., Climate Change and the Puget Sound: Building the
Legal Framework for Adaptation, 2 CLIMATE L. 299, 305 (2011) (calling for a new
legal paradigm and noting that “[b]ecause the impacts of climate change are
likely to occur over several decades, if not centuries, adaptation planning must
extend over an equivalent timeframe”); Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R.
Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1957, 1961 (2013); Robert L.
Fischman, Letting Go of Stability: Resilience and Environmental Law, 94 IND.
L.J. 689, 693 (2019).
36. See Fischman, supra note 35, at 689 (Professor Fischman explains that
“[s]tatic law will yield to experimentation and moral imperatives for change”
because “[h]istoric variation in the environment once served as a reliable guide
to future behavior. . . . Now climate change and other environmental stressors
are tipping systems into behaviors that no longer remain within the confines of
precedent.”); Jessica Owley, Climate-Induced Human Displacement and
Conservation Lands, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 665, 670 (2021) [hereinafter Owley,
Climate-Induced Human Displacement] (“[A] shift away from the most rigid
definitions and tools for conservation lands is more likely to accommodate climate
adaptation that includes migration.”).
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intervention as a moral and legal imperative. Drawing upon
legal concepts of waste and stewardship, scholars have
adopted the doctrine of intergenerational equity to guide the
forward-looking vantage of climate scholarship. 37 At its core,
intergenerational equity imposes a duty upon current
generations to think and act longitudinally across the past,
present, and future: to repair the environmental mistakes of
the past, maintain and improve environmental health in the
present, and to adapt human development and behavior to
prepare for future environmental challenges. 38 The doctrine
thus asks current generations to serve as trustees, entrusted
with a fiduciary duty to consider the interest of their
collective descendants. 39 In the context of climate change,
then, the duties posed by intergenerational equity serve as a
rallying cry for introspection, adaptation, and action today,
both as a matter of law and policy.
These principles can similarly apply to the issue of
37. See, e.g., Anthony L.I. Moffa, Wasting the Planet: What A Storied Doctrine
of Property Brings to Bear on Environmental Law and Climate Change, 27 J.
ENV’T L. & LITIG. 459, 467 (2012) (exploring intergenerational equity in the
context of environmental law); E. Lees, Property in the Anthropocene, 43 WM. &
MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 541, 550 (2019) (describing intergenerational equity
as holding “the earth in trust for future generations”); Steven J. Eagle, A
Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental Regulation, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 725, 727 (2013) (“Intergenerational equity calls for equality among
generations in the sense that each generation is entitled to inherit a robust planet
that on balance is at least as good as that of previous generations.”(quoting Edith
Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198, 200 (1990))). See also generally EDITH BROWN
WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989) (formulating the concept);
David M. Forman, Applying Indigenous Ecological Knowledge for the Protection
of Environmental Commons: Case Studies from Hawai‘i for the Benefit of “Island
Earth,” 41 U. HAW. L. REV. 300, 309–13 (2019) (discussing the history of the
concept); Lydia Slobodian, Defending the Future: Intergenerational Equity in
Climate Litigation, 32 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 569, 571 (2020); James C. Wood,
Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change, 8 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 293,
297–307 (1996); Sharon Buccino, Our Children’s Future: Applying
Intergenerational Equity to Public Land Management, 31 COLO. NAT. RES.
ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 509, 512 (2020).
38. Moffa, supra note 37, at 467.
39. See Lees, supra note 37, at 543; see also Eagle, supra note 37, at 727.
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demographic change. As fiduciaries for future generations,
the precepts of intergenerational equity demand that current
stewards first look backwards—to correct the boundless
growth gospel of the past—and then look forward, to lay the
foundation for a future of manageable and sustainable
population change. There are surely a number of arenas
where today’s stewards could start their task. This Article
will focus on local government and property law, two legal
regimes that have played a central role in American
population growth, and, therefore, must also play a role in
preparing for future demographic decline.
B. Decline in the Local Government Experience
In an era of tepid growth and declining populations on a
national or global scale, local governments, too, will be forced
to reckon with demographic shrinkage. Municipal decline in
the United States is historically viewed as an anomaly, a fate
reserved primarily for Rust Belt cities and rural small towns,
generalized through lenses of postindustrial decay and
suburban growth. 40 But if a declining city is considered an
aberration when the national population is growing, local
decline becomes common—and then widespread—as
national growth begins to slow. 41 This process is necessarily
40. See Justin B. Hollander & Jeremy Németh, The Bounds of Smart Decline:
A Foundational Theory for Planning Shrinking Cities, 21 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE
349, 349–50 (2011) (examining a prevailing historical view of population decline
being part and parcel of postindustrial urban decay and suburban growth).
41. Japan offers a prominent example of the relationship between national
and local decline. Although the country has reported a declining population since
2009, and recently reported a raw decrease in population between 2015 and 2020,
Tokyo bucked this trend and continued growing until last year, when it began to
report a small population decline. Tokyo now joins an increasing number of
Japanese metropolitan regions experiencing decline. See Japan’s Population Fell
by 868,177 Over Five Years, 2020 Census Shows, JAPAN TIMES (June 25, 2021),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/06/25/national/japan-populationdecline/; Hideyuki Sano, Japan Property Funds Feel Pinch as Tokyo Population
Drops Amid Pandemic, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2020, 9:44 PM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/japan-property-population/japan-property-funds-feel-pinch-as-tokyopopulation-drops-amid-pandemic-idUSKBN27J07Y; Japan Population Declines
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an uneven one. When birth rates decline and populations
age, larger cities with diverse housing options might in fact
experience a period of growth, as household sizes shrink and
urban living becomes more appealing to young workers and
retirees alike. 42 Ultimately, though, it is challenging for local
population trends to escape the shadow of national
demographic change. 43 When taking into account the vast
number of local governments in the United States, 44
probability suggests that a percentage of these, perhaps an
appreciable one, will continue to grow even following a
national shift towards demographic decline. But the zerosum reality of a slow or no-growth country is that today’s
boomtowns might be tomorrow’s ghost towns—and crucially,
that localities may suffer this fate without the pains of
deindustrialization commonly associated with American
urban decline to date. 45

at Fastest Pace Yet, with Only Tokyo Seeing Significant Growth, JAPAN TIMES
(July 12, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/07/12/national/japanpopulation-declines-fastest-pace-yet-125-2-million-government/; Sophie Buhnik,
From Shrinking Cities to Toshi no Shukushō: Identifying Patterns of Urban
Shrinkage in the Osaka Metropolitan Area, 23 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 132, 142 (2010);
Yukiya Iwasaki, Shrinkage of Regional Cities in Japan: Analysis of Changes in
Densely Inhabited Districts, 113 CITIES, June 2021, at 1, 2.
42. See Sylvie Fol & Emmanuèle Cunningham-Sabot, Urban Decline and
Shrinking Cities: A Critical Assessment of Approaches to Urban Shrinkage, 674
ANNALES DE GÉOGRAPHIE 359, 366–67 (2010), www.cairn-int.info/journal-annalesde-geographie-2010-4-page-359.htm.
43. See id. at 371–73 (reviewing research of national demographic change and
city shrinkage; noting that other factors were also at play in Eastern Germany
and Eastern Europe where national and local population decline accompanied
the end of the Cold War).
44. According to 2017 census figures, there are over 38,000 general purpose
local governments in the United States. 2017 Census of Governments, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-govern
ments.html (Oct. 8, 2021) (tbl. 2, Total Local Government Units – General
Purpose Governments).
45. See Fol & Cunningham-Sabot, supra note 42, at 369 (describing urban
shrinkage as a “global phenomenon” because “[e]ven if, at any given moment, the
shrinkage of certain agglomerations is accompanied by growth of cities located in
another part of the world, it is not impossible that these latter cities will undergo
shrinkage themselves within a relatively short time”).
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The history of local population decline in the United
States presents a cautionary tale. With their revenues
beholden to local taxes, communities often face an
accelerating downward spiral when their population base
begins to erode, one that precipitates other economic,
societal, and governance problems and ultimately triggers
further population loss. 46 As residents leave a locality,
economic activity and social cohesion dissipate. 47 Local
governments are forced to raise taxes to provide services to
the residents who remain, many of whom are often lowerincome and less able to pay for legacy infrastructure. 48 This
process triggers further rounds of exit among those who can
afford to leave and tax increases for those stuck behind. 49
Ultimately, the tax base erodes more quickly than the city
can reduce local services. 50 The municipality is burdened
46. KARINA PALLAGST ET AL., BERKELEY INST. OF URB. & REG’L DEV., THE
FUTURE OF SHRINKING CITIES: PROBLEMS, PATTERNS AND STRATEGIES OF URBAN
TRANSFORMATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 1, 7 (2009), https://escholarship.org
/uc/item/7zz6s7bm#main (discussing the “downward spiral” caused by decline);
Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1210–11
(2014) [hereinafter Anderson, New Minimal Cities] (discussing the cycle of
population decline).
47. See Maria Helena Guimarães et al., Residents’ Preferred Policy Actions for
Shrinking Cities, 37 POL’Y STUD. 254, 256–57 (2016).
48. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential
Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 132–33 (2017); see also Rachel S. Franklin, The
Demographic Burden of Population Loss in US Cities, 2000–2010, 23 J.
GEOGRAPHICAL SYS. 209, 220 (2021).
49. See Schleicher, supra note 48, at 113; Ben Beckman, Note, The Wholesale
Decommissioning of Vacant Urban Neighborhoods: Smart Decline, PublicPurpose Takings, and the Legality of Shrinking Cities, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 387,
395–96 (2010) (discussing the “challenging mismatch between tax receipts and
municipal outlays” when municipal populations decline); Anderson, New
Minimal Cities, supra note 46, at 1209–10 (“Government that gets smaller in the
wrong ways—for instance, through the deterioration of public safety and
schools—simply fuels the attrition of residents and businesses; and that, in turn,
means more individuals taking losses on their investments in a piece of land or
an enterprise, further losses to tax revenue, and further cuts to services.”);
Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal
Bankruptcy, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1213 [hereinafter Gillette, How Cities
Fail].
50. A local government may be obligated to maintain certain infrastructure
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with excess service and infrastructure costs, prompting
officials to postpone needed investment and chop needed
services haphazardly, leaving the community a less healthy
and appealing place to live. 51 Finally, in the last stage of
decline, devastated by teetering fiscal capacity and
decreasing sources of tax revenue, the locality might find
itself unable to escape the burden of legacy costs—pension
costs often foremost among them 52—causing the government
to enact predatory revenue-generation practices that target
vulnerable demographics who have not yet moved away. 53
These cycles have played out prominently in large industrial
cities across the United States since World War II, as
suburban growth, white flight, and postindustrial economic
transitions have triggered social and fiscal crises in the
urban core. 54
or services notwithstanding a degree of population loss. See Michael Pappas, A
Right to Be Regulated?, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 108 (2016) (discussing Jordan
v. St. Johns Cnty., 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), and the concept that
residents may hold a protected property interest in the government’s continued
maintenance of a resource); John Lovett, Moving to Higher Ground: Protecting
and Relocating Communities in Response to Climate Change, 42 VT. L. REV. 25,
51–52 (2017) (also discussing Jordan v. St. Johns County). But see Gillette, How
Cities Fail, supra note 49, at 1213 (arguing that even notwithstanding fiscal
distress and population decline, services may be oversupplied in some cities as a
consequence of patronage and other political decisions).
51. See Witold Rybczynski & Peter D. Linneman, How to Save our Shrinking
Cities, PUB. INT., no. 135, Spring 1999, at 30, 36–37 (regarding deferred
infrastructure and the attractiveness of a shrinking municipality to residents and
workers); Justin B. Hollander, Can a City Successfully Shrink? Evidence from
Survey Data on Neighborhood Quality, 47 URB. AFFS. REV. 129, 132 (2011)
(discussing diminished tax revenues, services, and fiscal capacity); Brent T.
White et al., Urban Decay, Austerity, and the Rule of Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 1, 49
(2014) (demonstrating that urban decline weakens the rule of law).
52. Anderson, New Minimal Cities, supra note 46, at 1146–47.
53. See generally Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
107 (2020); see also Robert A. McBride, Policing for Profit: How Urban
Municipalities’ Focus on Revenue Has Undermined Law Enforcement Legitimacy,
9 FAULKNER L. REV. 329, 340 (2018); Jodi Rios, Racial States of Municipal
Governance: Policing Bodies and Space for Revenue in North St. Louis County,
MO, 37 LAW & INEQ. 235, 237 (2019).
54. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) (regarding suburban growth);
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As a consequence of this history, legal scholarship on
local decline in the United States has focused almost
exclusively on shrinkage caused by a precipitating crisis. 55
Commentators have explored local population loss caused by
deindustrialization in the Rust Belt, the foreclosure crisis of
the 2010s in the Sun Belt, and natural disasters such as
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. 56 Attention has also turned
more broadly to local governments facing pronounced
vacancy and financial distress, stemming in large part from
a population exodus that occurred in the past. Yet two
significant perspectives are missing from the legal literature.
First, decline is routinely assessed through a retrospective
lens, one that looks at localities facing shrunken populations
today, not those that are currently growing and might be
vulnerable to contraction in the future. 57 Second, decline is
EDWARD MCCLELLAND, NOTHIN’ BUT BLUE SKIES: THE HEYDAY, HARD TIMES, AND
HOPES OF AMERICA’S INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND (2013) (regarding post-industrial
transitions).
55. Scholarship on decline more broadly is also a relatively new concept in the
field of local law. See Georgette Chapman Phillips, Zombie Cities: Urban Form
and Population Loss, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 703, 705 (2014) (“Historically,
legal scholars have paid particular attention to local land use as a method to
controlling growth. Not nearly enough attention, however, has been paid to local
land use law as a method of managing population shrinkage.” (footnote omitted)).
56. See Schleicher, supra note 48, at 135 (discussing shrinkage in Detroit and
Atlantic City); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Losing the War of Attrition: Mobility,
Chronic Decline, and Infrastructure, 127 YALE L.J.F. 522, 540–41 (2017)
[hereinafter Anderson, Losing the War of Attrition] (discussing Flint and other
Great Lakes cities); Samir D. Parikh & Zhaochen He, Failing Cities and the Red
Queen Phenomenon, 58 B.C. L. REV. 599, 601–02 (2017) (discussing cities facing
“financial Armageddon”); Beckman, supra note 49, at 389, 391, 446 (discussing
Detroit, Youngstown, Buffalo, and Cleveland); Samir D. Parikh, A New Fulcrum
Point for City Survival, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 231–32 (2015) [hereinafter
Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival] (discussing municipalities facing
fiscal distress).
57. See sources cited supra note 56; see also Phillips, supra note 55, at 705
(mentioning “Detroit, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland”). As an arguable
exception, climate scholarship envisions that a number of communities will
become uninhabitable or undesirable as a consequence of rising oceans or other
impacts of climate change, thus causing population loss in these areas and
climate-induced migrations on a national or global scale. See, e.g., Owley,
Climate-Induced Human Displacement, supra note 36, at 686–87 (discussing
climate change migration). Even so, climate scholarship still operates against the
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viewed as a consequence of an external economic or social
transition; underexplored is the prospect that demographic
change might itself become a precipitating factor in a world
of aging populations and falling birthrates. In short, decline
is seen as an acute anomaly set against a backdrop of
growth—as a symptom of crisis rather than a catalyst for it. 58
This perspective stands in contrast with a growing body of
non-legal scholarship that recognizes municipal population
decline as a discrete looming issue. 59
backdrop of population growth or stability; while some places may lose residents
due to climate change, other places are expected to benefit. See, e.g., Anderson,
Losing the War of Attrition, supra note 56, at 525 (due to climate change, “many
weak areas are located away from the coasts, including the Gulf,” which “means
that mobility tomorrow will look different than it does today, and it would be wise
not to burn the bridges that will allow a cost-effective return to the Rustbelt’s
strategic interior location at the shores of the Great Lakes”).
58. Some commentators approach in passing the issue of national
demographic change spurring local population decline. See, e.g., Parikh, A New
Fulcrum Point for City Survival, supra note 56, at 221 (“Municipalities have
historically enjoyed immense stability. This era of tranquility is over, and fiscal
deterioration is accelerating.”); Anderson, Losing the War of Attrition, supra note
56, at 541 (in the context of climate change, noting that “[w]ith these changes
looming ahead, phrases like ‘strong city’ and ‘weak city’ begin to look temporary”);
Anderson, New Minimal Cities, supra note 46, at 1215 (in the context of pension
reform, noting that national-level population decline has become an issue in
Western Europe).
59. See, e.g., Hollander, supra note 51, at 130–33 (looking at Germany and
the Midwestern United States to argue for smart decline); Stefanie Döringer et
al., A Meta-Analysis of Shrinking Cities in Europe and Japan. Towards an
Integrative Research Agenda, 28 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 1693, 1693–94 (2020)
(identifying shrinkage as a significant global issue when comparing and
contrasting decline research in Japan and Europe); Fol & Cunningham-Sabot,
supra note 42, at 362 (summarizing international literature and arguing that
decline must become a “structural, long-term component of urban development”);
Karina Pallagst, The Interdependence of Shrinking and Growing: Processes of
Urban Transformation in the USA in the Rust Belt and Beyond, in SHRINKING
CITIES: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 59, 60 (Karina
Pallagst, Cristina Martinez-Fernandez & Thorsten Wiechmann eds., 2013)
(noting that demographic decline is a mainstream urban planning topic in Europe
yet less so in the United States and arguing that “many cities” in the U.S. need
to plan for shrinkage, which requires a new planning paradigm to replace
existing urban planning approaches); Michael Ribant & Xuwei Chen, A Typology
of U.S. Shrinking Cities, 72 PRO. GEOGRAPHER 152, 152 (2020) (illustrates
shrinkage as a nationwide problem, one that extends beyond the realm of
postindustrial economic transition, by examining and categorizing 367 shrinking
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C. Decline in Local Government Theory
Local governments have a prickly relationship with the
issue of population loss. As a matter of human history, cycles
of growth and decline mark the typical lifecycle of a town or
city. 60 As a matter of local governance, however, decline is
incompatible with the dominant operative theory of
boundless growth and diffuse development. Growth theory
emerged in the United States during a period of twentiethcentury industrial might, and gazing forward from that
vantage point in time—an era when birth rates rose and
regional economies boomed 61—local leaders readily adopted
cities in the United States); Maxwell Hartt, The Prevalence of Prosperous
Shrinking Cities, 109 ANNALS AM. ASS’N GEOGRAPHERS 1651, 1663–65 (2019)
(challenging the view that population decline is solely a symptom of economic
decline). As with legal scholarship, however, non-legal research in the United
States still also views population decline as a symptom of non-demographic
crises. See generally, e.g., Hollander & Németh, supra note 40 (examining
literature on population decline, which historically has been viewed through a
social construct of suburban growth and urban decay); Fol & Cunningham-Sabot,
supra note 42 (same); Rybczynski & Linneman, supra note 51 (examining central
city decline against the backdrop of suburban growth); Andreas Luescher &
Sujata Shetty, An Introductory Review to the Special Issue: Shrinking Cities and
Towns: Challenge and Responses, 18 URB. DESIGN INT’L 1 (2013) (discussing Rust
Belt and Sunbelt decline during the Recession as a product of economic forces);
Andrea Sarzynski & Thomas J. Vicino, Shrinking Suburbs: Analyzing the Decline
of American Suburban Spaces, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 5230 (2019) (exploring
suburban shrinkage).
60. See Fol & Cunningham-Sabot, supra note 42, at 364 (“The decline of cities
has been a reality as long as cities themselves have existed.”); Phillips, supra note
55, at 708 (“History is replete with once thriving cities that dwindle to nothing.”);
Rybczynski & Linneman, supra note 51, at 39 (noting decline in ancient Rome
and Venice); Schleicher, supra note 48, at 134 (discussing literature contrasting
urban growth and decline in France and Briton in the early modern era). The
historical prevalence of decline in urban history does not necessarily indicate,
however, that population shrinkage is just as inevitable to the city lifecycle as
death is to the biological one. See Hollander & Németh, supra note 40, at 352–54
(comparing “neighborhood life cycle theory” with “alternative neighborhood
change theory”).
61. See generally WILLIAM H. FREY & ALDEN SPEARE, JR., REGIONAL AND
METROPOLITAN GROWTH AND DECLINE IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 3 (1988) (chapter
on “Components of Metropolitan Growth and Decline”); THE GOLDEN AGE OF
CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE (Stephen A. Marglin &
Juliet B. Schor eds., 1990).
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the assumptions that their municipalities would grow for the
foreseeable future, that any population loss was merely
temporary, and the implication, ultimately, that these
communities would continue to exist in perpetuity. 62
The “growth machine” theory has maintained a firm hold
in city halls across the United States. 63 Today, acting on this
mindset, elected officials pursue development as a way to
improve—and prove—the size and economic strength of their
communities. 64 Mayors promote population growth as a
barometer of successful governance. 65 And even stakeholders
62. See Hollander, supra note 51, at 130 (noting growth theory as dominant);
Fol & Cunningham-Sabot, supra note 42, at 361 (“Urban stakeholders have
always been convinced of the need for growth . . . with shrinkage conceived until
now only as a blip in a process in which recovery would necessarily follow.”
(citations omitted)). Regarding the worldview in which growth theory emerged,
see Beckman, supra note 49, at 396 (discussing industrial U.S. cities as
characterized by growth, yet noting that “[i]n hindsight, these cities were
themselves temporary phenomena”); see also James L. Tatum III, To Disappear
A City, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 105, 106 (2019) (“Under most assumptions, cities,
towns, and other municipalities are expected to exist in perpetuity. . . .”).
63. The concept was originally articulated by Harvey Molotch. See Harvey
Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82
AM. J. SOCIO. 309 (1976). But see Vicki Been, City Nimbys, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T
L. 217, 220 (2018) (describing the urban growth machine model as “overlysimplistic” but a “useful generalization”). Been pushes back on the traditional
generalization of larger cities driven by growth and smaller local governments
(i.e., suburbs) driven instead by exclusion. Id. Yet for purposes of this Article,
both pro- and anti-growth perspectives act against a background assumption of
growth as a baseline phenomenon. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
64. Pallagst, supra note 59 (discussing planning in U.S. cities as focused on
growth and development); Beckman, supra note 49, at 397 (observing that
“growth-oriented economic-development initiatives spend current revenue in an
attempt to recreate the population growth that was the sine qua non of America’s
great historical cities”); Richard Schragger, Does Governance Matter? The Case of
Business Improvement Districts and the Urban Resurgence, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 49,
49 (2010) [hereinafter Schragger, Does Governance Matter] (discussing the
preoccupation with “creating a market-oriented environment” at the municipal
level to attract residents and business). This is not to say, however, that economic
development initiatives indeed have a causal connection with local growth. See
generally Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local
Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311 (2010).
65. See, e.g., Matthew Dolan, Mayor Aims to Reverse Detroit Exodus, WALL
ST. J. (June 22, 2014, 7:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mayor-mikeduggan-aims-to-reverse-detroit-exodus-1403480663 (quoting Detroit’s Mayor
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who are opposed to growth nevertheless frame their
opposition against a backdrop that accepts population
increase as a baseline reality. 66
Communities experiencing population loss are not
immune from the prevailing growth mentality. Here, too,
local leaders maintain a rhetoric of growth in the face of
decline. Historically, a host of interventions and initiatives—
ranging from wholesale neighborhood demolition to regional
government—have been identified as ways to increase the
population of an area losing residents. 67 When population
decline becomes acute, cities have sometimes shifted their
rhetoric to embrace “smart decline,” a diffuse doctrine that
among other concepts promotes rightsizing infrastructure
and services, repurposing vacant land for nonresidential
uses, and taking measures to develop and activate
greenspace. 68 But even local governments that acknowledge
Duggan that “[t]he single standard a mayor should be defined on is whether the
population of the city is going up or going down”); Editorial, Lori Lightfoot’s WideAwake Take on the ‘Illinois Exodus,’ CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2019, 1:10 PM)
(discussing Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s focus on population growth in Chicago),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-illinois-exoduspopulation-chicago-cook-20190419-story.html.
66. Legal commentators have explored two closely related interest groups
that oppose local growth: homevoters who push local policies that maximize
residential real estate values, often to the detriment of development, and the
broader category of NIMBYs (not-in-my-backyarders), who oppose development
plans and projects in their communities, sometimes driven by exclusionary
motives and sometimes by concerns of gentrification and displacement. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES (2001) (discussing homevoters); Been, supra note 63, at 222 (discussing
NIMBYs). Despite opposing and at times stymying local development,
homevoters and NIMBYs still share a belief rooted in growth, as both factions
tend to oppose development on the fear and possibility that it will lead to further
development in their communities. See Been, supra note 63, at 243. Even
stakeholders opposed to growth, therefore, operate within a framework that
anticipates growth in the future.
67. Beckman, supra note 49, at 397 (“Tax abatement, gentrification, slum
clearance, urban-growth boundaries, urban homesteading, land banks,
aggressive annexation, and the formation of regional governments have all been
advocated as ways to subsidize central-city growth.”).
68. See generally Lisa Berglund, Critiques of the Shrinking Cities Literature
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decline still hold out hope for renewed population growth. 69
For example, in 2013, officials in Detroit released a plan
called Detroit Future City that expressly adopted smart
decline as the city’s global approach to development and
service provision going forward. 70 The plan nevertheless
oriented itself around the prospect of future growth. Rather
than truly breaking from the growth machine norm and
planning for a prospect of long-term population decline,
scholars have charged that Detroit Future City offered in fact
a pro-development rubric that attempted instead to reset
growth—to create new markets and drive new investment in
certain neighborhoods but not in others. 71 Research on other
localities experiencing population loss has found a similar
disconnect: while the present reality of decline is
acknowledged by local leaders, planning documents still
anticipate a future rebound. 72
The growth machine model’s intractability is easy to
understand. When population growth is viewed as a sign of
successful governance, decline becomes a stigma, a political
issue that is pushed into the future rather than addressed in

from an Urban Political Economy Framework, 35 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 423 (2020)
(summarizing the literature on smart decline solutions to local population loss).
The concept of “smart decline” is derived from the theory of smart growth, an
equally diffuse theory that advocates for controlled growth. See Pallagst, supra
note 59; cf. Jen Gray-O’Connor, Solutions in Search of Problems: The
Construction of Urban Inequality in “Smart Growth” Discourse, 53 BERKELEY J.
SOCIO. 89, 92–93 (2009).
69. See Phillips, supra note 55, at 707.
70. See DETROIT FUTURE CITY, 2012 DETROIT STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK PLAN 10,
11 (2013), https://detroitfuturecity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/DFC_Exec
utiveSummary_2ndEd.pdf.
71. Berglund, supra note 68, at 429–30; see also Andrea J. Boyack, A New
American Dream for Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 573, 626 (2016) (examining
Detroit’s decline through the lens of revitalization).
72. See, e.g., Megan E. Heim LaFrombois, Yunmi Park & Daniel Yurcaba,
How U.S. Shrinking Cities Plan for Change: Comparing Population Projections
and Planning Strategies in Depopulating U.S. Cities, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH.,
June 23, 2019, at 1, 8–10, https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X19854121.
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the present. 73 A politically opportune time to tackle
population decline therefore never arises. Before decline,
during an era of growth, the notion that stakeholders might
want to prepare for future population loss is anathema to
local political thought and practice. 74 Efforts at this point to
anticipate decline must overcome entrenched local inertia
and could run quickly into strong headwinds—such as a legal
regime built around growth, 75 opposition from private
interests and public employees towards proposed service
reductions, 76 and the prospect or concern that by merely
73. See Pallagst, supra note 59 (describing the taboo of shrinkage); Maxwell
Hartt, Shifting Perceptions in Shrinking Cities: The Influence of Governance,
Time and Geography on Local (In)action, 25 INT’L PLAN. STUD. 150, 150 (2020),
(discussing the stigma of shrinkage planning); Schragger, Does Governance
Matter, supra note 64, at 65 (noting that “the failure of the city has often been
viewed as a moral failure”). In other contexts, as well, government actors defer
decisions about thorny policy issues that implicate or may restrain development.
See, e.g., Alexander B. Lemann, Assumption of Flood Risk, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 163,
177–81 (2019) (discussing Congressional inertia regarding flood insurance
programs).
74. Scholars have documented the issue of local decision-making driven by
the exigencies of present political interests, notwithstanding the adverse impact
of those decisions on future residents of the community. See Clayton P. Gillette,
Can Municipal Political Structure Improve Fiscal Performance?, 33 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 571, 572 (2014) [hereinafter Gillette, Municipal Political Structure].
Similarly, others have noted that local governments are prone to inertia and path
dependency, which complicates efforts to address novel and future-facing issues.
See generally Gabriel Eidelman, Failure When Fragmented: Public Land
Ownership and Waterfront Redevelopment in Chicago, Vancouver, and Toronto,
54 URB. AFFS. REV. 697 (2018).
75. See Sean B. Hecht, Local Governments Feel the Heat: Principles for Local
Government Adaptation to the Impacts of Climate Change, 47 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 635, 640 (2013) (discussing the challenge of overcoming governmental
inertia when planning for a future crisis rather than waiting for its arrival);
Phillips, supra note 55, at 707 (describing land use laws as focused on growth,
not decline); Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best
Option: Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change Puzzles,
47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 697 (2013) (noting, in the context of climate
adaptation, that the goal of “managed retreat” runs into a property law regime
designed to promote opportunity and stability).
76. See, e.g., Bob Oakes, Polls Shows Strong Opposition from Boston
Residents to MBTA Service Cuts, WBUR (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.wbur.org
/news/2020/12/03/massinc-poll-mbta-service-cuts-koczela (discussing transit cuts
in Massachusetts); Adam Schuster, Illinois Public Services Being Cut to Pay
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planning for shrinkage, local leaders might inadvertently be
facilitating it. 77 All the while, a developing or ostensibly
healthy community continues to grow in a manner that
might later prove unsustainable and unstable, driven by
growth machine policy and pro-growth land use law. 78
Local governments fare no better trying to intervene
after decline has morphed into a demographic reality. The
longer population stagnation has already set in, the more
likely a locality faces an eroding tax base and attendant fiscal
distress, not a recipe conducive to successful governmental
interventions. 79 Governments in the throes of population
decline must make difficult, almost impossible decisions:
which basic services to cut, which neighborhoods to
prospectively decommission, and how to prioritize
increasingly depleted resources for the people who have
remained—all decisions that implicate equity concerns and
tend to have disparate impacts on minority and low-income
residents. 80 A stigma against shrinkage planning persists
Unsustainable Pension Cost, ILL. POL’Y, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports
/illinois-public-services-being-cut-to-pay-unsustainable-pension-cost/
(last
visited May 30, 2022) (discussing pension cuts in Illinois); see also Anderson, New
Minimal Cities, supra note 46, at 1188–1205 (exploring the rights held by
residents to a minimal degree of service provision in a distressed city).
77. Compare Anderson, Losing the War of Attrition, supra note 56, at 528,
with David Schleicher, Surreply: How and Why We Should Become Un-Stuck!,
127 YALE L.J.F. 571, 572 (2017) (debating whether service reductions are a
problematic cause of population loss or a necessary response thereto).
78. See Phillips, supra note 55, at 719 (observing that “most of the existing
law is zoning for the control of growth; not zoning for planned decline”).
79. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (discussing tax base erosion
and fiscal distress as part of the cycles of local population decline); see also Huang
et al., supra note 35, at 300 (noting, in the climate change context, that
adaptation becomes more costly and painful the longer it is pushed into the
future); Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival, supra note 56, at 242–
48 (arguing that municipal debt restructuring becomes more challenging as its
fiscal standing becomes more dire).
80. See REBECCA BRATSPIES ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, FROM
SURVIVING TO THRIVING: EQUITY IN DISASTER PLANNING AND RECOVERY 9–10
(2018), https://cpr-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/survivingthriving_0918
.pdf (discussing equity issues that arise where policymakers are reactive in the
face of crisis); Schleicher, supra note 48, at 137–38 (discussing decisions to
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even where decline is acute, finally weakening only as the
issue becomes more dire. 81 Eventually, once the point of dire
decline has been reached and many residents of means have
left the locality, attempts to implement austerity or smart
decline measures will ultimately demand some form of forced
consolidation—of neighborhoods, services, or both—against
the likely opposition of the remaining populace. 82 Even in
Youngstown, Ohio, where the city’s Youngstown 2010 Plan
serves as the textbook blueprint for smart decline policies,
local leaders lacked the political will to require residential
consolidation. 83 While residents were offered incentives to
move out of certain neighborhoods in the interest of
consolidation, many declined the offer and the city refused to
use eminent domain. 84 Detroit likewise decided not to use
eminent domain as a tool for smart decline, ensuring that
consolidation would remain a touted yet elusive planning

allocate scarce resources and determine which neighborhoods to maintain). See
generally Victoria Morckel, Flint (MI) Missed an Opportunity to “Right Size” with
Its Water Crisis, 86 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 304 (2020) (discussing the
decommissioning of infrastructure in Flint, Michigan).
81. Only when decline is longstanding or has become particularly acute does
public opinion begin turning towards pro-shrinkage measures. See Hartt, supra
note 73; Phillips, supra note 55, at 724 (“It requires strong political will to suggest
zoning for shrinkage. Unfortunately, this will rarely exist absent dire
circumstances.”). Otherwise, smart decline policies may still remain unpopular
amongst local voters. See Christopher Weber, The Amazing Shrinking City: Can
Smart Decline Improve Urban Life?, ENV’T MAG. (Mar. 1, 2011),
https://emagazine.com/smart-decline/; see also Hollander & Németh, supra note
40, at 356 (smart decline initiatives often require a disengaged public).
82. See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text (discussing the cycles of
local decline); supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
smart growth); see also Schleicher, supra note 48, at 137–38 (discussing the
difficulty in shrinking neighborhoods and consolidating services in Detroit).
83. See THOMAS A. FINNERTY JR. ET AL, CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN, YOUNGSTOWN
2010 CITYWIDE PLAN (2005), https://www.wrtaonline.com/wp-content/uploads
/2020/09/Youngstown-2010-Citywide-Plan-full.pdf; see also Liz Boardman, As
Residents Leave, Locals Shrink Smartly, AM. CITY & CNTY. (July 1, 2008),
https://www.americancityandcounty.com/2008/07/01/as-residents-leave-localsshrink-smartly/.
84. See Boardman, supra note 83.
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goal. 85
Taken together, these challenges yield an unsurprising
yet vexing conclusion: there is simply no optimal time to plan
for local demographic decline. Too early and the concept is
stigmatized as a matter of politics and marginalized in the
realms of policy and law. Too late and the city lacks the
resources to adapt and the political will to take drastic
measures. At the period of transition, moreover, where
growth has stagnated but decline has not yet accelerated, it
may be difficult for stakeholders to realize that such a
transition is already underway. 86 In short, localities looking
to the future face a paralyzing conundrum: the political
mandate to confront decline emerges too late to muster
resources that no longer exist and plan for a sustainable
decline that has already begun.
II. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PROPERTY RECONFIGURATION
What to do? How can a locality break out of this
conundrum? Faced with a looming prospect of global
population stagnation, planners, administrators, and other
stakeholders must reconfigure their approach to growth by
85. See Peter D. Salins, Rethinking Urban Planning in Detroit—and Beyond,
in URBAN POLICY 2018, at 95, 105, 111 (Manhattan Inst. ed., 2018), https://www.
manhattan-institute.org/html/urban-policy-2018-rethinking-urban-planning-det
roit-and-beyond-11520.html (noting that “popular outrage” prevented
implementation of Detroit Mayor David Bing’s original plan to consolidate
residents and services). With consolidation via eminent domain proving
politically toxic in Detroit, elected officials in the 2010s steered clear of the topic,
choosing instead to embrace an anti-consolidation platform. Mayor Mike Duggan,
who succeeded David Bing in 2014 and was reelected to a third term in 2021, ran
on the platform that “every neighborhood has a future”—a pointed rebuke to
consolidation. See EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD HAS A FUTURE: MIKE DUGGAN’S
NEIGHBORHOOD PLAN, DUGGAN FOR DETROIT CAMPAIGN (2013), https://detroit.cbs
local.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/15909782/2013/09/duggan-crime-reductionplan.pdf (last visited May 30, 2022); see also Editorial, Duggan Turns Focus to
Neighborhoods, DET. FREE PRESS, Feb. 24, 2016, at 11A (“Every neighborhood has
a future, Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan promised, during his 2013 campaign to
become this struggling city’s leader.”).
86. See Anderson, New Minimal Cities, supra note 46, at 1205 (discussing the
creep of “[c]ultural and social bankruptcy” that precedes financial bankruptcy).
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shifting the time horizon of the growth machine model. In a
shift from its current form—which approaches present-day
growth as a precursor for perpetual future growth—the
model should approach growth today proactively, armed with
the understanding that population decline might become a
future reality. 87 This shift does not demand pessimistic
political visions or drastic austerity measures on the mere
prospect of future decline. Rather, it calls for built-in
flexibility. It asks that policy decisions guiding growth today
also provide future generations the tools to react and adapt
to demographic change tomorrow. 88 By imbedding current
practice with future flexibility, policymakers today can also
institutionalize the prospect of smart decline, thus
cushioning the political headwinds smart decline policies
may otherwise face if implemented down the road. 89
Of course, reconfiguring growth policies to prepare for
future decline is a tall order, one that could touch upon a
number of disciplines, ranging from urban planning to
economics to public administration. Yet at the core of local
growth reconfiguration sits the looming specter of property
law. Property law encourages growth by facilitating
development. Foundational precepts of property law orient
around the value of economic productivity, 90 while land use
87. Proactive planning has been broadly posited as a necessary departure
from the often-reactive approach seen in municipal administration. See, e.g.,
Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival, supra note 56, at 252–55
(regarding debt restructuring).
88. A similar call has been made in the context of climate change and
adaptation. See Fischman, supra note 35, at 693; Hecht, supra note 75, at 640.
89. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
alternatively binding or facilitating future local actors); see also Matthew T.
Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 403 (2016)
(arguing that risks can be easier to regulate at their inception).
90. See Nehal A. Patel, Mindful Use: Gandhi’s Non-Possessive Property
Theory, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 289, 294 (2014) (identifying economic
efficiency as a core principle of property law); Joseph H. Guth, Law for the
Ecological Age, 9 VT. J. ENV’T L. 431, 450–57 (2008) (discussing how property law
developed to promote economic growth); Owen Alderson, Comment, Abandoning
Corporate Ontology: Original Economic Principles and the Constitutional

2022]

REFORMING LOCAL PROPERTY

1145

and zoning law emerged alongside the growth machine
theory and treat growth as a normative baseline. 91 This Part
explores the promising yet problematic role that property
law plays in the intergenerational process of population
decline, and it identifies a model that corrals property’s
predisposition for long-term stability in a manner that
artfully imbues the doctrine with future flexibility, an
appealing approach when preparing for the consequences of
demographic change.
A. The Role and Challenge of Property Law
Cycles of local government decline are inescapably
intertwined with local land use. Where populations fall,
property is the resource that becomes abandoned, blighted,
and underutilized. 92 Densities decrease and gaps emerge in
the urban fabric, making infrastructure and service delivery
inefficient and costly. 93 Accordingly, when tax revenues
shrink and localities look to reduce costs, property also
becomes a target of crisis response. Leaders aim to chop
municipal services via geographic consolidation and by
decommissioning or reengineering municipal infrastructure

Corporation, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 576 (2020) (noting the historical view that
property rights are associated with economic growth).
91. See Steven P. Frank, Note, Yes in My Backyard: Developers, Government
and Communities Working Together Through Development Agreements and
Community Benefit Agreements, 42 IND. L. REV. 227, 230 (2009) (describing
Euclidean zoning as encouraging and defining growth in the postwar era); see
also Eliza Hall, Note, Divide and Sprawl, Decline and Fall: A Comparative
Critique of Euclidean Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 915, 922 (2007) (describing
Euclidean zoning as a “framework uncannily conducive to sprawl”); supra note
78 and accompanying text.
92. See Hollander, supra note 51, at 132.
93. Rybczynski & Linneman, supra note 51, at 37. But see Maxwell Hartt &
Jason Hackworth, Shrinking Cities, Shrinking Households, or Both?, 44 INT’L J.
URB. & REG’L RSCH. 1083, 1092 (2018) (arguing that population decline is
significantly accompanied by a decrease in average household size, which to a
degree may reduce population densities without decreasing the number of
occupied housing units in a city).
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to support a more concentrated service area. 94 Consolidation
enables localities to focus on areas of stability, lessening the
public costs that are both directly (e.g., infrastructure and
services) and indirectly (e.g., health, blight, and safety)
associated with a geographically piecemeal process of
decline.
Where consolidation is not viable, localities turn to smart
decline policies that also focus on property interventions. 95
Density gaps are addressed through smart decline programs
to bring agriculture, art, recreation, or community
stewardship to bear on vacant parcels. 96 These efforts may
improve community engagement, decrease crime, and stem
the residential exodus from the locality 97—all normatively
94. See Beckman, supra note 49, at 398 (discussing the benefits of geographic
service consolidation); see also Tatum, supra note 62, at 106 (discussing the
general issue of shrinking a locality without attendant shrinkage of
infrastructure and services). But see Michelle W. Anderson, The Western, Rural
Rustbelt: Learning from Local Fiscal Crisis in Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
465, 499 (2014) (pushing back on the concept of consolidating or decommissioning
land uses in response to population decline, at least in certain contexts, because
“historic places and modes of living have existence value, even when they have
trouble attracting residents and businesses in a competitive system”); Anderson,
Losing the War of Attrition, supra note 56, at 538–41 (acknowledging that local
infrastructure funding is premised on growth, yet advocating for national
infrastructure investment in shrinking localities). Scholarship has also proposed
down-zoning, decentralization, and enhanced suburbanization in response to
center city decline, see Rybczynski & Linneman, supra note 51, at 31, a position
applicable to a period of suburban and regional growth at the expense of urban
cores, less so to an era of across-the-board regional or national decline.
95. See Hollander & Németh, supra note 40, at 354 (describing smart decline
as a response to less land and fewer land uses).
96. See Berglund, supra note 68, at 428 (summarizing smart decline
literature and programs, which focus on vacant space activation initiatives);
Weber, supra note 81 (discussing parks and greenspaces).
97. See Gunwoo Kim et al., Urban Regeneration: Community Engagement
Process for Vacant Land in Declining Cities, 102 CITIES, Apr. 27, 2020, at 1, 6,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264275119307450
(article 102730) (discussing the relationship between smart decline and
community engagement); Amy E. Mersol-Barg, Note, Urban Agriculture & the
Modern Farm Bill: Cultivating Prosperity in America’s Rust Belt, 24 DUKE ENV’T
L. & POL’Y F. 279, 284 (2013) (discussing the ability for urban agriculture to
decrease neighborhood crime); Melanie J. Duda, Note, Growing in the D: Revising
Current Laws to Promote A Model of Sustainable City Agriculture, 89 U. DET.
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valuable goals. But they arguably offer palliative remedies
that do not solve the issues at the heart of population
shrinkage. 98 Smart decline programs instead run headlong
into a stark problem of property law: underutilized lands
cannot simply be deleted or removed. They cannot be
exchanged with utilized parcels elsewhere in the
municipality as a means of retaining density, maintaining
vibrancy, and consolidating local infrastructure. 99 Moreover,
much of the land in question tends to be privately owned—
both the utilized properties that still require local services
and the interspersed, underutilized ones that do not. 100 In
short, while decline pushes local leaders to seek geographic
solutions, intransient property quickly starts getting in the
way.
This is not to say that traditional property law lacks a
mechanism for rearranging or consolidating private land.
Notably, private property can be taken by eminent domain
MERCY L. REV. 181, 184 (2012) (same); Amy E. Frazier et al., The SpatioTemporal Impacts of Demolition Land Use Policy and Crime in a Shrinking City,
41 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 55, 59 (2013) (reviewing how demolition of vacant
buildings impacts crime); Daniel Hummel, Right‐Sizing Cities: A Look at Five
Cities, 35 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., no. 2, Summer 2015, at 1, 8 (articulating smart
decline measures, in part, as an attempt to “right-size” a locality and make it
more attractive to prospective residents).
98. See Phillips, supra note 55, at 722 (noting that “[t]hose who do write about
zoning and population loss focus instead on specific palliative remedies such as
urban farming and land banks” (footnotes omitted)).
99. The notion that density is vital for community health and vibrancy was
most famously articulated by Jane Jacobs. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE
OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 151 (1961).
100. Detroit offers a stark example of underutilized private land. Although it
is estimated that 24 to 40 square miles of the city are vacant, a significant amount
of vacant land is owned and controlled by private parties, which makes
development projects challenging and provides disproportionate power to large
private landlords in the planning process. See John Gallagher, Social Media is
Arguing About How Much Vacant Land Is in Detroit—And the Number Matters,
DET. FREE PRESS, https://www.freep.com/story/money/business/john-gallagher
/2019/10/26/detroit-vacant-land/4056467002/ (Oct. 28, 2019, 9:48 AM); Louis
Aguilar, Detroit’s Battles Over Once-Cheap Land Are ‘Sign of New Era,’ DET.
NEWS, https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2019/06/12/det
roits-battles-over-once-cheap-land-sign-new-era/1257351001/ (June 11, 2019,
11:39 PM).
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for public use—a process, however, that is monetarily costly
where property is valuable and politically costly even where
it is not. 101 Public entities can also engage in bargaining with
private owners or enact legislation that incentivizes or
encourages the sale of certain private properties; yet these
efforts risk derailment by just one or several holdouts
exercising veto power over a comprehensive planning
scheme. 102 Zoning can also prod private owners towards
specific land uses over time. 103 Yet, thus far, zoning has been
largely sidelined and underutilized as a tool of smart
decline. 104 In recognition of these property law limitations,
101. Ruoying Chen, Invited Takings: Supermajority, Assembly Surplus, and
Local Public Financing, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2309, 2311 (2015) (noting local
government hesitance to use eminent domain); Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana
Land Reform in the Storms’ Aftermath, 53 LOY. L. REV. 727, 729 (2007) (noting
the challenge of using eminent domain as a crisis-response tool in post-Hurricane
Katrina New Orleans); Lovett, supra note 50, at 33 (observing that in many cases,
“when local communities reject the proposed use of eminent domain, government
officials invariably comply with their demand”); supra notes 83–85 and
accompanying text (discussing Youngstown and Detroit’s decisions not to use
eminent domain as a tool to consolidate property uses and address population
decline). But see Beckman, supra note 49, at 391, 398 (advocating for eminent
domain as a tool of smart decline, despite labeling it a “last-resort strategy”;
likewise arguing that the financial costs of eminent domain can be offset by
reduced service delivery in decommissioned neighborhoods).
102. See Beckman, supra note 49, at 391 (“With any municipal-contraction
plan, however, a small number of unwilling owners could destroy the projected
efficiency gains by refusing to relocate.”); Boardman, supra note 83 (discussing
the refusal of many Youngstown residents to move neighborhoods,
notwithstanding incentives offered from the city). On the issue of land
consolidation and holdout vetoes more broadly, see Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly
Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1490–91 (2008).
103. See, e.g., Sarah Schindler, The “Publicization” of Private Space, 103 IOWA
L. REV. 1093, 1117 (2018) (“Zoning is one of the most powerful tools that
municipalities have for extracting public goods from private parties.”).
104. In Youngstown, despite creating a much-heralded plan to embrace and
restructure the city around the reality of population loss, translating that plan
into zoning regulations implicated political, economic, and legal hurdles that
blunted the plan’s extension into zoning law. See Brent D. Ryan & Shuqi Gao,
Plan Implementation Challenges in a Shrinking City: A Conformance Evaluation
of Youngstown’s (OH) Comprehensive Plan with a Subsequent Zoning Code, 85 J.
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 424, 440 (2019); Pallagst, supra note 59; supra note 91 and
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scholars have proposed a number of alternative models and
reforms designed to facilitate fractured land consolidation in
a manner that overcomes the challenges posed by eminent
domain, holdout vetoes, and other traditional tools. 105 Other
models offer additional creative ways to configure property
after a community has reached the latter stages of population
decline. 106
Yet still missing from these tools and reforms is a
paradigm that enables intergenerational land use
adaptability. 107 Just as growth planning requires built-in
flexibility that allows future generations to confront the
prospect of long-term population decline, so too must
property law evolve to embrace flexibility and adaptability
across generations. Reconfiguring local growth and decline
accompanying text (discussing zoning’s pro-growth posture).
105. See, e.g., Heller & Hills, supra note 102, at 1468 (advocating for “land
assembly districts”); Chen, supra note 101, at 2313–14 (advocating for “invited
takings”). Similarly, scholars have advocated for more flexibility at the local
jurisdictional level, such that municipalities have greater ability to dissolve,
merge, and consolidate. See Anderson, New Minimal Cities, supra note 46, at
1219–20.
106. See, e.g., Nate Ela, Urban Commons as Property Experiment: Mapping
Chicago’s Farms and Gardens, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 258–86 (2016)
(discussing property experimentalism in Chicago neighborhoods already
experiencing vacancy and divestment); Frank S. Alexander, Land Bank
Strategies for Renewing Urban Land, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L.
140, 140 (2005) (discussing land banks as a tool to address vacant, abandoned,
and foreclosed properties); Anne E. Kline, A Case for Connecticut Land Banks, 88
CONN. BAR J. 210, 210 (2015) (same). Other models used in the context of growth
may also offer creative reconfigurations in the context of decline. See, e.g., Eagle,
supra note 37, at 760–65 (applying transferrable development rights and
exactions to prospective climate change challenges).
107. Perhaps the closest is the land banking model, which in theory can act as
a repository of property during periods of decline in anticipation of future
revitalization and growth. See Frank S. Alexander, Land Use Planning by Design
and by Disaster, in LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 37,
38 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009) (describing land banking as “a land use
structure that permits inventories of land to be held in reserve in order to respond
to the shifts in market conditions and determinations of the social good”). By its
nature, however, this focus on revitalization still positions itself against a
normative baseline of future growth. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 124.752
(West 2022) (finding “development” and “economic growth” as central purposes
of land banks in Michigan).
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demands a reconfiguration of property law, too. 108 Should a
growing municipality face decline in the future, local
policymakers will need more than eminent domain, zoning
plan updates, and palliative smart decline measures to
manage excess resources.
B. Adaptability in Intergenerational Property Law
Reconfiguring property law on an intergenerational level
necessarily implicates temporal property rights held across
time. As with climate change, where intergenerational
equity imposes obligations upon current stewards of the
environment, property law may need to modify—or arguably,
reset 109—the temporal rights held by property owners today
in the interest of future generations. 110 If property rights in
the future are less absolute, municipalities will have more
flexibility to adapt to population shrinkage and reassemble
the built environment proactively, without resorting to the
problematic traditional tools at their disposal. At the same
time, however, making property rights more flexible in the
future should not eviscerate the underpinning values they
are designed to protect today. 111
Property law is no stranger to this balancing act.
108. A number of scholars have called for more dynamic and adaptive modern
approaches to property. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles,
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 837, 840 (2013); Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene
Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 46 (2017); Fischman, supra note 35, at 704–05; Lynda L.
Butler, Property’s Problem with Extremes, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 45 (2020);
Huang et al., supra note 35, at 332.
109. See infra notes 119–121 (discussing temporal limitations recognized in
traditional property law).
110. See generally Lees, supra note 37 (exploring the interplay between
stewardship obligations and property rights).
111. See Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 803, 805 (2013) (discussing the need to balance between flexibility and
stability in property law, while noting that “the most equitable and efficient
adjustments to property-rights regimes are those that respect rather than
disregard property owners’ existing entitlements”); see also Eagle, supra note 37,
at 746 (“A strong system of private property rights promotes economic well-being
and also protects individual liberty and autonomy.”).
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Principles of stability and adaptability are both fundamental
to core property doctrines, and navigating between these
principles is a core task when reconfiguring property for an
Anthropocenic age of decline. 112 On the one hand, property
regimes are famously designed to be static across time. 113 In
the realms of real property and land use, in particular,
doctrines ranging from Euclidean zoning to eminent domain
to fee simple ownership all advance values of predictability
and stability; they provide interest-holders with rights,
incentives, and assurances that encourage their investment
into a property today with the expectation of protecting that
value in the future. 114 This goal of stability traces its roots to
fundamental precepts of English common law, where
cohesive intergenerational land ownership served as a
driving force behind primogeniture and other intestacy
doctrines. 115 Stable property rights might have promoted
efficient uses and reduced costs in an agrarian society. 116 But
in a modern urban setting, static rights across time can
112. See Biber, supra note 108, at 46 (discussing the pressure modernization
of property systems will pose in the Anthropocene on doctrinal property rules).
Some scholars envision that the Anthropocene will mark an era in human history
with no appreciable historical precedent, with climate change placing such
stressors on existing law that adaptability will necessarily overcome the system’s
preference for stability. See Fischman, supra note 35, at 710–11.
113. See John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74
TENN. L. REV. 463, 474–76 (2007) (summarizing and citing literature on the
concept); Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation,
Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 862–74 (same).
114. See Hall, supra note 91, at 918 (regarding zoning); Butler, supra note 108,
at 42–47 (regarding eminent domain); Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2016) (regarding the “everlasting” fee simple); see also
David M. Becker, Debunking the Sanctity of Precedent, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 853, 858
(1998) (describing the fee simple absolute as an estate that “reflects infinity,”
which is grounded in the framework that “when it comes to land, one must
presume that the time frame is forever”).
115. See Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and
Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 399 (2006) [hereinafter
Priest, Creating an American Property Law]; Claire Priest, The End of Entail:
Information, Institutions, and Slavery in the American Revolutionary Period, 33
LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 277–78 (2015).
116. Fennell, supra note 114, at 1459.
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create costly intergenerational externalities, borne out at the
local level where the allocation of private rights today may
impact countless future neighbors, development plans, and
land use regimes. 117 Static property doctrines arguably treat
the city itself as a static concept too. 118
On the other hand, property law’s stability has
nevertheless been tempered by a degree of flexibility and
adaptation across time. Even traditional property law
recognizes certain temporal limitations: institutions viewed
in one light as static have also, at times, evolved to embrace
adaptive change, or themselves grew out of a dynamic
response to changing conditions. Euclidean zoning was first
endorsed by the Supreme Court as a modern response to
urban realities, while the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause
is viewed by some justices to permit government actions that
reflect incremental changes in foundational property
principles. 119 Static property law today is often the product
of evolutionary adaption in the past. 120 As part of this
117. Id. at 1496 (“Maintaining dominion over a physical thing in perpetuity is
no longer a particularly good way of ensuring access to the relevant stream of
payoffs over time.”); Biber, supra note 108, at 48 (discussing spillover costs in the
Anthropocene); Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call
for the End of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 121, 122–
23 (2011) [hereinafter Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World]
(discussing the intergenerational issues caused by static, perpetual conservation
easements today).
118. Phillips, supra note 55, at 705 (“At best, traditional zoning law treats the
city as a static concept; at worst, it imposes antiquated and unforgiving strictures
that fail to provide enough flexibility for organic and dynamic change.”); see also
Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning Straitjacket: The Freezing of American
Neighborhoods of Single-Family Houses, 96 IND. L.J. 395, 401–14 (2021)
(examining how zoning codes often “freeze” land uses in established
neighborhoods).
119. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87, 397 (1926);
see also John G. Sprankling, Property Law for the Anthropocene Era, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 737, 748 (2017) (discussing Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365); see also Phillips,
supra note 55, at 719–20 (same).
120. See Rule, supra note 111, at 803 (“Some of the most influential property
scholarship of the past half century has centered on this evolutionary process,
identifying factors that tend to spark the initial formation of property rights in
an asset, influence the optimal structuring of new property-rights regimes, and
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evolution, land use doctrines have adopted temporal limits
on property rights in a number of contexts: in estates, where
a defeasible fee can cut short an ownership interest in the
future; in zoning, where code changes and non-conforming
uses can operate to gradually shift static environments over
time; and in the doctrines of covenants and waste, both of
which adjudicate disputes between generations. 121
Simply put, the relationship between property rights and
time is a delicate one. 122 Property rights are permanent yet
subject to change. Property rights give present generations
control over future ones—that is, unless such control is
tempered or altered by an existing or novel application of
property law. This balancing act offers one option for
addressing the prospect of future decline: local policymakers
can simply be passive to the issue of demographic change,
continuing to implement growth machine and “smart
growth” policies while remaining neutral to the possibility of
population loss in the future and electing not to prepare for
it. If and when a demographic transition occurs, whereby
national growth stalls and then begins to fall, local leaders
can hope that property law will evolve to meet this new
reality. Just as the Euclid court decided in 1926, 123 courts
may view population decline as a modern challenge that
warrant adjustments to such regimes over time.”); see also generally Karrigan S.
Börk, An Evolutionary Theory of Administrative Law, 72 SMU L. REV. 81 (2019)
(exploring evolution in legal systems). Indeed, efforts to make property law less
intergenerationally static go back centuries. See, e.g., Timur Kuran, The
Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations
of the Waqf System, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 841, 868 (2001).
121. See Sprankling, supra note 119, at 747–57; Moffa, supra note 37, at 470–
79. See generally John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72
MO. L. REV. 1209 (2007) (discussing the importance of waste doctrine during
times of radical and dramatic change in property law); Celeste Pagano, Where’s
the Beach? Coastal Access in the Age of Rising Tides, 42 SW. L. REV. 1, 17–19
(2012) (discussing rolling easements).
122. Regarding the concept of legal time generally, see Frederic Bloom, The
Law’s Clock, 104 GEO. L.J. 1 (2015).
123. See Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386–87 (describing zoning code as a modern
response to modern complexities of urban life).
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property regimes must accommodate—all the more pressing
if climate change is simultaneously causing widespread
dislocations and legal upheaval. 124 Efforts to decommission
neighborhoods, consolidate services, and bring vacant
private land into public control may be sanctioned,
notwithstanding any infringement upon private property
rights that would appear ultra vires or unconstitutional
today. 125 History has not been kind to this passive, wait-andsee decline strategy. 126 But in a world where shrinkage has
become the norm—not merely a Rust Belt phenomenon
chalked up to post-industrialization, fiscal mismanagement,
and race—courts and public stakeholders might be more
receptive to radical innovations.
The delicate relationship between property rights and
time offers another option, however: local governments can
pursue proactive steps to prepare for decline, taking actions
that support private property rights today while
simultaneously creating temporal limitations on those rights
in the future. This process grants future local officials
flexibility to pursue some of the measures listed above—i.e.,
decommissioning neighborhoods, consolidating services, and
bringing vacant private land into public control—with a
secure rather than speculative legal power to do so.
C. A New Approach to Intergenerational Property Law
The above discussion brings us to the crux of this Article:
how, exactly, could a proactive property approach to decline
be implemented? If existing property tools are insufficient,
how can the legal regime be reconfigured to bolster existing

124. See Biber, supra note 108, at 46 (arguing that the Anthropocene will
pressure traditional property doctrines, including the takings doctrine).
125. See Lees, supra note 37, at 586 (exploring whether the concept of private
property may become “endemically problematic” in the Anthropocene such that
it should be abandoned).
126. See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
cycles of decline in local government).
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tools, or add new ones, to the property arsenal?
Professor Lee Anne Fennell has charted the blueprint of
an answer. In an article titled “Fee Simple Obsolete,” 127
Professor Fennell challenges the prudence of perpetual
property rights across time, as epitomized most popularly by
the fee simple absolute, and provides a framework for
bringing temporal limitations into private property
ownership. 128 Her article advocates for two new tenure
forms: the callable fee simple, where property is sold subject
to a call option, such that it could be repurchased in the
future if certain conditions are met; and the floating fee
simple, a form of estate whereby owners could periodically
shift their interests from one geographic parcel to another. 129
Both concepts offer a mechanism for securing private
property rights today while also permitting flexibility in the
future. Specifically, a callable fee simple would enable local
governments
to
create
“callblocks”—synchronized,
presumably contiguous properties that could share the same
trigger conditions and someday be recalled en masse into
public ownership. The trigger condition would therefore have
two purposes. First, it would offer an alternative to
inadequate current options for public land assembly. 130
Second, by establishing clear metrics for when a property
might get recalled, a callable fee simple could still encourage
investment, alienability, and productive use—especially
where the trigger condition appears remote in the future or
unlikely to occur. 131
A floating fee, meanwhile, aims to loosen the connection
between property estates and geography across time. As

127. Fennell, supra note 114.
128. See id. at 1459.
129. Id. at 1465.
130. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing land assembly
challenges); supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to
remedy these challenges).
131. Fennell, supra note 114, at 1486–87.
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Professor Fennell notes, modern property owners might not
gain value from the particular plot of land their house or
business occupies; rather, ownership value derives from the
spatial position of the property—its proximity to other
residences, amenities, and institutions. 132 Granting owners
all rights across time, yet tying those rights to a specific
parcel of land, is an inefficient allocation of resources for
private and public stakeholders alike. The floating fee simple
thus affirms private property rights (by giving owners
spatial flexibility) while also giving local governments
another tool for reconfiguring development patterns in the
future.
Professor Fennell’s proposal also navigates the balancing
act between property’s competing instincts of stability and
adaptability. While Professor Fennell calls for legislative
action to codify these new tenure forms, she also maintains
that they fit within the existing numerous clauses that
organize the estate system today. 133 A callable fee, in
particular, is consonant with current and traditional
approaches to the defeasible fee simple. 134 Like defeasible fee
simples, a callable fee carves an estate out of the fee simple
absolute, conditioned or limited by a circumstance that
might terminate the estate rather than see it continue in
perpetuity. 135 The two are perhaps distinguished more in
132. Id. at 1490 (“In cities, it is the relative spatial position of real property,
not the land itself, that principally accounts for a parcel’s value.”); id. at 1496
(describing “buildings and plots of land less as ultimate repositories of value than
as mechanisms for accessing value that resides elsewhere”).
133. See id. at 1510. On the value of standardized property forms, see Thomas
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 69 (2000); Meredith M. Render,
The Concept of Property, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 471 (2017) (describing the
numerus clauses principle as foundational to property theory). Regarding the
interplay between standardization and dynamism, see Nestor M. Davidson,
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1610–18
(2008).
134. Fennell, supra note 114, at 1465.
135. See Bruce M. Kramer, Property and Oil and Gas Don’t Mix: The Mangling
of Common Law Prop. Concepts, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 540, 544 (1994) (discussing
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form than in function. 136 As generally applied, the defeasible
fee is tied to events arising on the property itself; for
example, a property may revert to the grantor or a third
party if not used or managed in a certain way, or if certain
activities are—or are not—conducted upon it. 137 The callable
fee simple, meanwhile, looks not to the whims of a single
owner, but rather to the government’s assessment of macro
conditions that inform change on a neighborhood or city-wide
level. This distinction advances two property law objectives
where a callable fee simple is used. First, administrative and
enforcement concerns are diminished when the government
holds the right of reverter or reentry in place of a private
party. 138 Second, while a current owner might chafe at the
restrictions placed by the prior owner on a property—the
classic issue of “dead hand control” 139—a callable fee’s trigger
condition could anticipate external societal dislocations.
Thus, the callable fee would act not at the command of an
outmoded dead hand but instead as an escape valve in the

the distinction between the fee simple determinable, which uses words of
limitation, and the fee simple subject to condition subsequent, which uses words
of condition). While this distinction can be important, both offer a manner by
which a defeasible fee simple may end. See Roger W. Andersen, Present and
Future Interests: A Graphic Explanation, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 101, 106 (1995).
136. See D. Benjamin Barros, Toward A Model Law of Estates and Future
Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 18 (2009) (arguing that “[m]ost of the
differences between the fee simple determinable, the fee simple subject to
condition subsequent, and fee simple subject to executory limitation are marginal
and unnecessary”).
137. See, e.g., Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property
Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN.
ENV’T L.J. 51, 89 (2011) (“[A] grantor creates a fee simple defeasible because he
wants to control the behavior of the grantee with respect to the land.”).
138. See Molly S. Van Houweling, Disciplining the Dead Hand of Copyright:
Durational Limits on Remote Control Property, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 67
(2017) (discussing statutory reforms to the defeasible fee simple based, in part,
on concerns that “the present-day owners of such possibilities often cannot be
ascertained or located and it becomes impossible to obtain releases in the
ordinary manner” (quoting Hiddleston v. Neb. Jewish Educ. Soc’y, 186 N.W.2d
904, 907 (Neb. 1971) (Newton, J., concurring))).
139. See id. at 63–68 (discussing “dead hand control” generally).
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face of significant future change. 140
In this manner, creating temporal limitations within the
framework of a callable fee simple comports squarely with
property law theory. As much as forward-looking stability is
fundamental to property law, social science has
demonstrated how people struggle to think decades into the
future. 141 When owners seek stable property rights, then,
they surely care to ensure stability today, in the present, and
in many cases also care to maintain that stability for children
and grandchildren. But our connection to property grows
looser as we begin to consider great- and great-greatgrandchildren. In the language of Professor Margaret
Radin’s personhood theory of property, a parcel of land might
be quintessentially “personal”—a function of living on the
property today and holding memories of people and
experiences tied to that land in the past. 142 The property
becomes more fungible and thus replaceable as one gazes
into the distant future, however, with no memories to sustain
those ties and as the people and conditions upon on the
property become more abstract. 143
140. See Christopher Serkin, The Wicked Problems of Zoning, 73 VAND. L. REV.
1879, 1902 (2020) (citing to studies on hedonic adaption, the capacity for humans
to adopt to future changes, including significant adverse ones).
141. See Jane McGonigal, Our Puny Human Brains Are Terrible at Thinking
About the Future, SLATE (Apr. 13, 2017, 10:01 AM), https://slate.com/technology
/2017/04/why-people-are-so-bad-at-thinking-about-the-future.html (discussing
the concept and summarizing a study that found most Americans “rarely or never
think about the ‘far future,’” defined as “something that might happen 30 years
from today”); see also Serkin, supra note 140, at 1902 (citing to studies about
consumer behavior and humans’ poor capacity to predict how a product will affect
them in the future). Our imperfect relationship with the future impacts our
ability to assess future risk, notably in the context of climate change. See, e.g.,
Lemann, supra note 73, at 217; Molly J. Walker Wilson, Cultural Understandings
of Risk and the Tyranny of the Experts, 90 OR. L. REV. 113, 165 (2011).
142. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
960 (1982) (setting forth the distinction between “personal” and “fungible”
property); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1071, 1073 (2011) (regarding the connection between property and memory).
143. See Radin, supra note 142, at 960. But see Fennell, supra note 114, at 1514
(acknowledging that “new tenure forms would undervalue and disrupt the deep
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Protecting static rights thus makes progressively less
sense as the time horizon lengthens. Even though current
and prospective property owners seek rights that will last in
perpetuity, human expectations operate on a shorter scale; it
is not considered or expected that an estate will truly last as
long as advertised. 144 A callable fee simple can capitalize on
that disconnect. It can inject adaptivity into the void beyond
the reaches of human expectation. For this reason, Professor
Fennell’s model has been identified by scholars as a
mechanism to prepare for climate change. 145 Its precepts
extend to the Anthropocene’s other looming societal
transformation, as well. Demographic change offers an
opportunity to put the model into practice.

connections that people form with land”); Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted?
The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place, 127 YALE L.J.F. 458, 464, 466–68
(2017) (highlighting individual connections people form to a place).
144. Individual expectations have been incorporated into property theory,
often in the context of takings doctrine. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The
Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
281, 316–17 (2002); Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed
Expectations,” 32 URB. LAW. 437, 445 (2000); Daniel R. Mandelker, InvestmentBacked Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 225–26 (1995). The focus
on expectations has been critiqued for bringing variable future possibilities into
property rights and prioritizing economic interests. See Eagle, supra, at 445 (“The
lack of a clear demarcation between ownership rights as protected by the
Constitution and the range of expectations that a landowner or regulator or judge
might glean about the future is an aspect of our jurisprudence that makes it more
likely that the law of grabber and grabbee will prevail.”); Arnold, supra, at 317
(noting “the primacy of property-as-commodity inherent in an expectations
theory”). Endorsing intergenerational expectations would require, per this
understanding, a finding that today’s interest-holder reasonably expects to
realize economic value on their investment decades or centuries into the future.
See Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1657–58 (2003) (critiquing that an expectations analysis
can implicate normative assumptions about what is “reasonable”).
145. For the most direct examination of Professor Fennell’s scholarship in the
context of climate change, see Sprankling, supra note 119, at 767.
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III. CREATING A PROPERTY MODEL FOR POPULATION DECLINE
The callable fee offers a compelling vehicle to prepare for
population decline. In a given community, a callblock of
properties could share a common trigger condition associated
with demographic change. A decrease in population, changes
in density, a slowing rate of growth, or an increasingly aged
populace—or some combination of one or more of these
factors—could prompt the callblock’s recall when manifested
on a neighborhood, regional, or city-wide basis. 146 Under an
alternative yet similar approach, the trigger condition could
address the issue from the opposite direction, looking not at
demographic decline in a vacuum but instead in the context
of excess service provision, i.e., where services or
infrastructure in a callblock neighborhood exceed to some
degree the number of residents living and working there. A
model already exists for quantitively appraising the ability
of local infrastructure to keep pace with growth. 147 A callable
fee’s trigger condition could simply flip that switch in the
context of decline.
Under either approach, the properties would revert to
public ownership once the trigger condition occurs, granting
the local government a viable way to reduce services and
decommission neighborhoods across a contiguous swath of
parcels, ideally accomplished without the political and
monetary hurdles of eminent domain. 148 The callable fee
146. Professor Fennell touched upon the prospect of population or density
change driving a callblock’s trigger condition. See Fennell, supra note 114, at
1484 (“Thus, a trigger condition might be significant population changes that are
not matched by commensurate densification (or de-densification) within the
callblock.”).
147. Adequate public facilities ordinances, also called concurrency ordinances,
seek to ensure that growth occurs in lockstep with infrastructure capacities. See
S. Mark White & Elisa L. Paster, Creating Effective Land Use Regulations
Through Concurrency, 43 NAT. RES. J. 753, 754 (2003); Serkin, supra note 140, at
1904–06; see also Gillette, How Cities Fail, supra note 49, at 1227 (noting the
quantifiable nature of service reductions).
148. Regarding the hurdles posed by eminent domain, see supra notes 84–85,
101 and accompanying text. Regarding the question of cost and whether the
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thus offers an adaptive backstop to decline. It provides an
outlet from the cycles of divestment, tax base erosion, and
predatory revenue generation that traditionally accompany
population loss by giving local governments a tool they
ordinarily lack: the ability to be geographically incisive—to
direct resources towards areas of consolidation and
population stability, to permit resource reductions in other
areas, and to accomplish this reallocation without the pitfalls
often seen where smart decline initiatives are pursued. 149
Callblocks mitigate most crucially against the pitfalls of
smart decline by giving future politicians political cover to
implement these wholesale measures. When a property is
subject to a trigger condition, the trigger itself can shape
expectations over time by establishing a new default
perspective on the neighborhood’s future. 150 For example, if
the call option arises when local population density falls
below 1,000 people per square mile, we can expect that
residents will have an evolving relationship with this figure
over time. At first, when density in the neighborhood is
significantly higher—perhaps 5,000 or 10,000 people per
square mile—the trigger condition appears remote and
abstract. As densities decline the condition becomes more
tangible and a new status quo emerges; perhaps the 1,000
person-per-square mile figure even comes to represent a
meaningful dividing line between a viable and unviable
neighborhood. Finally, as local density approaches the
trigger condition, action by the government is now expected.
Local leaders still have flexibility in exercising the call
government must pay to exercise a call option in this context, see infra note 158
and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 81, 98, 104 and accompanying text (discussing smart
decline).
150. In a similar vein, see Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing
Discrimination from the Built Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1, 44 (proposing
default sunset provisions on existing public monuments; while future
governments could still take affirmative action to prolong the sunset date, doing
so would flip the baseline presumption from one of inaction (not applying a sunset
provision) to action (applying the sunset provision at default)).
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option. But now they operate in an environment where not
exercising the option reflects a departure from baseline. 151
A similar phenomenon can play out if the trigger
condition never comes to pass. In these situations, even as
the adaptive safety valve built into the callable fee remains
dormant, the trigger condition still offers a voice in planning
and development decisions. It asks, first and foremost, that
residents and officials think along a broader time horizon
than they are accustomed to using. 152 It signals a locality’s
stance on what form decline would take if manifested, which
offers a countervailing opportunity to fashion a
commensurate local definition of growth. 153 And all the
while, it can inform planning documents and zoning codes,
serving as a rubric for how the city grows even if it never
ultimately experiences decline.

151. This furthers a valuable anti-entrenchment goal. In theory, when a
government conveys a defeasible fee simple, the limitations or conditions tied to
that property may entrench the decisions of subsequent governments. See
Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 901–02 (2011) (setting forth the issue and
discussing the concern that “the government has kept the property in its policy
tentacles after the transfer”). Entrenchment can both facilitate and inhibit
normative policy. A poor policy decision today could bind policymakers tomorrow,
just as a positive, yet politically challenging choice could embed itself in a manner
that eases political headwinds in the future. See id.; see also Matthew Titolo,
Leasing Sovereignty: On State Infrastructure Contracts, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 631,
637 (2013) (discussing the issue in context of infrastructure privatization). Yet
regardless of the policy values at stake, the very concept of entrenchment cuts
both ways, too. A decision today might bind legislators tomorrow—or a decision
today could grant greater legal flexibility and political maneuverability to those
future legislators. The callable fee simple aims to epitomize the latter approach.
152. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing the challenge of
thinking into the distant future).
153. The line between growth and decline can be a fine one, both in policy and
in practice. See, e.g., supra note 86 and accompanying text. Offering a clearer
strategy for one can bolster the local approach to the other.

2022]

REFORMING LOCAL PROPERTY

1163

A. Sketching the Framework
The above discussion indicates several ways to apply
Professor Fennell’s proposal in the context of demographic
change, at its core by incorporating an assessment of
population decline or excess service capacity into a trigger
condition that returns a set callblock of properties to public
ownership. But what trigger condition should be used? What
will occur until the condition arises? And what then?
Drawing on the principles and priorities discussed above,
this Section will attempt to sketch the framework of a
callable fee simple as applied to future demographic change.
As a starting point, in order to encourage development
and alienability in the present while also creating a future
backstop of flexibility, the trigger condition should be tied to
quantifiable, longitudinal data that operates on a decade-todecade basis, not a month-to-month or year-to-year one.
Decennial census data immediately comes to mind. The
census is taken every ten years and provides a relatively
accurate snapshot of national population trends; 154 further,
it is constitutionally mandated and unlikely to be
discontinued in the foreseeable future. 155 A community could
easily adopt census data as its core indicator of decline.
Using census data, a callblock could be triggered when the
population within a municipality falls by a significant
percentage from one census to the next—say, twenty percent
or more—or by a lesser but still significant percentage,
perhaps ten percent or more, across two consecutive
154. See Tammany J. Mulder, Accuracy of the U.S. Census Bureau National
Population Projections and Their Respective Components of Change 1, 38–39
(Population Div., U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 50, 2002),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/
POP-twps0050.pdf (noting improved census accuracy over time); see also D’Vera
Cohn, How Accurate Will the 2020 U.S. Census Be? We’ll Know More Soon, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/14
/how-accurate-will-the-2020-u-s-census-be-well-know-more-soon/ (explaining the
tools and programs used to review census accuracy).
155. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (directing that an enumeration of the
population occur “every . . . Term of ten Years”).
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decennial censuses. This would reflect a cautious,
longitudinal approach that aims to promote stability and
alienability in the present and short-term future, with the
trigger condition approaching only after the demographic
situation truly turns dire on the ground.
Adoption of the trigger condition would set market and
planning forces in motion. All properties subject to the
callable fee would be labeled as such, on deeds and planning
documents alike, demarcating the parcel as designated for
future recall. A neighborhood full of these properties could
then be termed a Future Contraction District (FCD).
Let’s briefly imagine a city that has just created an FCD.
We will assume the city is currently experiencing slow but
steady growth, ranging perhaps from five to ten percent over
the past few decades. We will also assume that the second
trigger condition—a ten percent decline in two subsequent
censuses—is adopted as the FCD’s standard for recall. At
first, the properties in the FCD might realize no impact from
the callable fee model. The trigger condition at this point is
remote and abstract. Properties will still be alienated and
devised much like other properties in the city. Perhaps the
properties will command mildly lower market values,
particularly if zoned commercial or industrial and being
committed towards long-term use by a corporate entity. At
the same time, though, the city is still growing. Any discount
to be found in the FCD might well entice lower-income
residents and entrepreneurial business ventures, perhaps
counterintuitively turning the FCD into a creative hub and
instead boosting its property values. 156
If and when the city’s demographics change and its
156. On the concept and economic value of attracting the “creative class” to a
locality, see generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND
HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002).
See also Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for
Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63, 96 & n.133 (2013) (noting critiques of the
connection between the creative class and economic growth, yet still observing
that many local governments have embraced the idea).
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population growth stagnates and then declines, the FCD’s
value can be expected to fall once that decline appears to
reflect a long-term trend. A couple divergent possibilities can
now be imagined. On the one hand, the FCD’s population
might decline faster than the city’s at large, as the looming
trigger condition facilitates an exodus of residents and
investments from the neighborhood—a situation that may
lend some geographic cohesion to decline occurring citywide
because other neighborhoods will gain some of these
residents, giving local officials a head-start on service
consolidation. On the other hand, the FCD’s population
decline offers residents an alternative and novel tenure
option: the ability to acquire a property interest with more
security and equity than a leasehold, but one that is,
simultaneously, also cheaper and perhaps not quite as
everlasting as a fee simple absolute. 157 This “in-between”
tenure option grants flexibility to property owners who are
on the fence about the city’s future, both current property
owners contemplating an exit and prospective owners
seeking a bargain. Certainly, if the city’s rate of population
decline begins to slow or reverse, FCD properties will carry
an investment appeal for those bullish about the
community’s future.
But alternatively, at the final step of our hypothetical,
we can imagine a scenario where the city’s population does
indeed decline by ten percent in two consecutive census
administrations. Now the callback has been triggered. The
local government’s call option could provide two variable
next steps. Following Professor Fennell’s articulation, the
properties could revert to public ownership via a public call
option, a step that might require some compensation tied to
their then-minimal market values. 158 Under a more
157. Professor Fennell posits that this “in-between” option could expand
housing choice and housing stock within a community, thus providing housing
options to a larger number of families. See Fennell, supra note 114, at 1513–15.
158. See infra notes 173, 194–200 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth
Amendment takings implications). Professor Fennell contemplates that property
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conservative approach, drawing on the zoning doctrine of
nonconforming uses, properties could simply be treated as
undevelopable natural, recreational, or passive space under
local zoning code and owners given a period of time to align
their use with this new classification. Either way, rather
than pursing piecemeal, incomplete, and ultimately
ineffective approaches to smart decline, as in Detroit and
Youngstown, local leaders will now have the ability to
consolidate services and decommission neighborhoods in a
unified manner. 159
Even so, as a matter of politics and practicality, residents
and businesses in the FCD cannot be expected to pack up and
leave the neighborhood overnight. As indicated with the
second approach, but equally applicable to the first, an
amortization or sunset period for nonconforming uses is in
order. 160 Commercial, industrial, and investment properties
could be granted a specific grace period before services will
be withdrawn. Owner-occupied residential properties could
be granted a longer grace period, perhaps via another
adaptive use of property law—by turning the callable fee into
a life estate, with the measuring life determined by the
person living on the land when the trigger condition occurs.
When that person dies the amortization period ends, as a
consequence alleviating concerns of individual displacement
reconfiguration will entail some constitutional “just compensation,” see U.S.
CONST. amend. V, but also notes that reconfigurations have occurred in the past
without payment to private interest-holders. See Fennell, supra note 114, at
1498–1500.
159. The flexibility offered by an FCD can also swing the other way: by
promising flexibility if decline becomes a reality, local leaders have a tool that
makes preemptive austerity measures less compelling, including passive or
active decisions to reduce infrastructure or service spending, decisions that
themselves can accelerate population exit. See Anderson, Losing the War of
Attrition, supra note 56, at 528, 537.
160. Just as callable fee simples are not incompatible with defeasible fee
estates, so too does the winding-down process described here resemble doctrines
already well-established in property law—for example, the doctrine of
nonconforming uses in the face of zoning change. See Sprankling, supra note 119,
at 765.
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while also creating a grace window that might extend for a
number of years. 161
Our hypothetical ends once all grace periods are over.
The municipality now can reduce services to the FCD, direct
and consolidate those services elsewhere, and update its
zoning code to reflect a new reality, one where the FCD’s
operative legal regime is no longer tied to the growth
machine. Depending on the needs of the community and the
resources available, the properties in the FCD could be
demolished
and
dedicated
towards
conservation;
alternatively, they could be left in their current state, a
passive and economical solution that leaves open the door to
redevelopment in the future. Under any approach, the FCD
will no longer command resources and services, which can
help stabilize the locality in two important ways. First, the
locality’s savings from decommissioning the FCD may
temper predatory revenue generation practices that often
yield inequitable impacts, serving only to accelerate cycles of
decline. 162 Second, by disproportionately concentrating
decline within the FCD, communities can reduce the density
gaps that otherwise tend to emerge in the urban fabric of a
shrinking city, a situation that also stresses public finance
and health and accelerates those same decline cycles. 163
This sketch presents just one possible approach and only
a few of the contingencies and alternatives that may arise in
the process. 164 Inherent when planning for the future—and
161. Of course, a locality could decide to set a shorter timetable. Too short,
however, and the government increases the risk of equity concerns and takings
violations. Under a longer grace period, yet one still short of the life estate model,
residents are given more time to strengthen their attachments to the properties
and accrue more mobility challenges as they age. See Pollack & Strahilevitz,
supra note 16, at 565–66 (discussing the higher relocation costs faced by older
people).
162. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing predatory revenue
generation efforts during the final stages of local decline).
163. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing density gaps in the
context of decline).
164. See Fennell, supra note 114, at 1486 (“Of course, the callable fee is not a
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especially when planning for an era that will be
conspicuously different from our own—is an overriding
caveat of uncertainty. We cannot say with confidence how
population decline will operate on a national or local level. 165
Consequently, there is no crystal ball that explains
unequivocally how a callable fee simple model would or
should operate, either. But we can appreciate that the model
offers flexibility in the future that does not exist today.
Moreover, we can also expect that the model will encourage
and diversify planning and market behavior away from a
pure growth machine ideology even before population decline
arrives.
B. Addressing Implementation Concerns
A neighborhood of callable fee estates—or as termed
above, an FCD—offers future policymakers an appealing
reconfiguration of private property law. But today’s
policymakers might not share the sentiment. Worried about
a bond rating arriving next week or an election scheduled
next year, today’s officials don’t always have the luxury to
think into the future. 166 As Professor Fennell noted in “Fee
Simple Obsolete,” 167 and as others have similarly
acknowledged in the context of climate change, 168 the
prospect of a better model in the future still poses pesky legal
and administrative hurdles today.
The FCD model therefore raises several key questions
even as it aims to address others. First and foremost, how
single approach but rather a family of possibilities with a number of moving
parts—strike prices, time intervals, and trigger conditions.”).
165. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (assessing variables and
assumptions that can cloud demographic forecasts).
166. See, e.g., Gillette, Municipal Political Structure, supra note 74, at 572.
167. Fennell, supra note 114, at 1497 (asking how to handle “the initial
transition that is required to get such a system of limited fees started in the first
place”).
168. See, e.g., Sprankling, supra note 119, at 758 (“Major legal change is
difficult to implement, for reasons that are both prudential and practical.”).
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can a local government convert a fee simple estate into a
callable fee? If a new development is carved and subdivided
out of public land, the local government could transfer the
parent parcel subject to a trigger condition, effectively
creating a callable fee in the same manner as a defeasible fee
simple. 169 But local growth does not necessarily occur on a
blank canvas. In a community that is largely built-out,
property is already splintered between public and private
ownership. 170 These are perhaps the very neighborhoods
where an FCD model is needed. 171 The standard solutions for
gaining control over property, meanwhile—piecemeal
acquisition of land or eminent domain—both bring our
endeavor back to the static, costly, and muddled
interventions that a longitudinal reconfiguration of property
law is expressly trying to avoid. 172 And a wholesale
conversion of fee simple properties to the callable fee model,
standing alone, might invite Fifth Amendment takings
challenges. 173

169. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text (comparing callable fees
with defeasible fee simples).
170. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that vacant land
in Detroit is fractured between public and private ownership).
171. Fennell, supra note 114, at 1497 (“The places where reconfiguration is
likely to be most valuable going forward may very well be already developed and
fragmented among many owners.”).
172. See supra notes 84–85, 101 and accompanying text (regarding eminent
domain); supra note 102 and accompanying text (regarding land assembly
through voluntary acquisition); see also Fennell, supra note 114, at 1497 (noting
that “concerns about eminent domain form part of the rationale for using limited
fees to ease reconfiguration”).
173. But see Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise
Adaptation Tools “Takings-Proof,” 28 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 157, 189–90 (2013)
(discussing ways that climate adaptation strategies could withstand a takings
challenge, and noting that even some more aggressive adaptation measures could
be analyzed as a “partial taking” under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), rather than a “total” taking under Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), a standard that tends to be
favorable towards the state action); see also Mulvaney, supra note 108, at 840
(advocating for a takings doctrine that reflects modern principles and addresses
modern challenges).
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The second key question moves from the “how” of
reconfiguration to the “where” of an FCD model. History
indicates that the decision of where to locate a callblock will
necessarily implicate equity concerns. The traditional cycles
of divestment and decline have left behind disparate racial
and economic impacts. 174 So, too, does the history of
government interventions into local growth and mobility
more broadly. 175 How can we envision a more just FCD, one
that does not encourage future leaders to disproportionately
decommission low-income neighborhoods?
Finally, a third key question returns to the proposition
that policymakers and citizens alike struggle to confront
long-range issues. As discussed above, human psychology
does not embrace long-term thinking. 176 Neither do the
strictures of local governance. 177 Why should residents and
their leaders care today—and indeed, care to the degree
required to overcome inertia and reconfigure property law?
Answering these questions is the challenge of property
reconfiguration. There is no magic tonic that effortlessly
creates and implements new tenure forms, ensures just and
equitable treatment for those who may be impacted by its
future dislocations, and provides the political will needed for
these measures to get placed into motion. Yet this Article will
suggest, as a starting point, an organizing objective that can

174. See supra notes 48, 53, 54 and accompanying text.
175. Infamously, government has played a role in significant local
demographic transitions over the past century, with transformative processes
such as suburban growth and urban renewal driven by governmental action and
serving to entrench segregation in American cities. See generally RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017). See also Verchick & Johnson, supra note 75, at 698
(noting that “efforts to keep people out or relocate them are highly susceptible to
discriminatory motives and disparate impacts”). More recently, smart decline
measures have also faced criticism for creating or deepening racial and economic
distinctions between local neighborhoods. See generally Berglund, supra note 68
(citing commentators).
176. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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confront these hurdles: zoning for density.
Before examining how density could overcome the
challenges and advance the goals of local property
reconfiguration, it is worth acknowledging the normative
value density offers to local development and growth—and,
as well, to local decline. During times of growth, dense
development serves economic, public safety, quality of life,
and environmental goals; it facilitates social cohesion,
reduces transportation costs, and mitigates against the
spread of sprawl, among other interests. 178 A dense built
environment also proves advantageous during times of
decline. Where development is more compact, the effects of
demographic shrinkage can be less acute: density promotes
the agglomeration of economic activity, which lends fiscal
resilience to denser metropolitan areas facing decline, 179 and
it encourages consolidation of infrastructure and services,
reducing a shrinking city’s per-capita carrying costs. 180 The
benefits of density are therefore unsurprising when
178. See generally Sarah J. Fox, Planning for Density in A Driverless World, 9
NE. U. L. REV. 151, 174–76 (2017) (discussing the environmental, transit, and
anti-sprawl values of density); ROBERT BURCHELL ET AL., TRANSIT COOP. RSCH.
PROGRAM NO. 39, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL—REVISITED (1998), http://onlinepubs.trb
.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_39-a.pdf (regarding the interplay between density
and social cohesion); Erick Guerra, Xiaoxia Dong & Michelle Kondo, Do Denser
Neighborhoods Have Safer Streets? Population Density and Traffic Safety in the
Philadelphia Region, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH., May 5, 2019, at 1, https://doi.org/
10.1177/0739456X19845043 (regarding density and public safety). See also
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: Housing Plans as Preemptive
Intergovernmental Compacts, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 124–28 (2019) (discussing the
benefits of density and the concept of “density mandates”).
179. See Arthur Nelson et al., Compact Development as a Factor in Income
Resilience Among Shrinking Counties in the United States, in SHRINKING CITIES:
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 301, 301, 308 (Harry W. Richardson & Chang Woon Nam
eds., 2014).
180. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing infrastructure
consolidation); see also Phillips, supra note 55, at 736–39. Commentators have
further noted that population decline is accompanied by smaller household sizes,
a trend that calls for more diverse housing and thus a move away from lowdensity, single-family development. See Hartt & Hackworth, supra note 93, at
1092; see also Fennell, supra note 114, at 1483, 1513 (advocating for density as a
goal of property reconfiguration).
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considering future population decline. If the ills of decline are
driven, in part, by falling density levels in local
communities, 181 it follows that communities starting from
places of higher population densities will be relatively
buffered when demographic change begins.
In recent years, proponents of density have pushed local
governments to reform their zoning codes through
residential “upzoning,” a change in classification to permit
more intensive uses and thus, generally, a denser built
environment. 182 Coming at a time of rising housing costs and
a national reckoning with institutional racism, upzoning has
been recognized as a way to increase housing supply and
affordability while promoting economic mobility, in theory
reducing racial inequities in high-income urban areas. 183
181. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the issues posed by
declining density and emerging gaps in the urban fabric).
182. See Richard W. Bartke & John S. Lamb, Upzoning, Public Policy, and
Fairness—A Study and Proposal, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 702 n.10 (1976)
(setting forth a definition of “upzoning”). Regarding the recent push for upzoning
in a number of American cities, see Erika Bolstad, Trending: Upzoning for
Affordability, 85 APA PLAN. MAG., no. 9, Oct. 2019, at 12, 12; Elmendorf, supra
note 178, at 125–26.
183. Minneapolis made headlines in 2018 for its embrace of zoning reform,
approving a “Minneapolis 2040” plan to upzone the majority of the city. See
Patrick Sisson, Can Minneapolis’s Radical Rezoning Be a National Model?,
CURBED (Nov. 27, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://archive.curbed.com/2018/11/27/1811
3208/minneapolis-real-estate-rent-development-2040-zoning; Steven P. Katkov
& Jon Schoenwetter, Minneapolis’s Great Experiment: An Introduction to the
Minneapolis 2040 Comprehensive Plan, BENCH & BAR OF MINN. (Mar. 2, 2020)
https://www.mnbar.org/resources/publications/bench-bar/articles/2020/03/02/mi
nneapolis-s-great-experiment-an-introduction-to-the-minneapolis-2040-compreh
ensive-plan. Arguments for upzoning have gained steam in the aftermath of
Minneapolis’s move and as part of a larger societal reckoning with the racial
impact of traditional zoning codes. See, e.g., Laura Bliss, The Upzoning Wave
Catches California, YIELD PRO (Apr. 20, 2021), https://yieldpro.com/2021/04/theupzoning-wave-catches-california/; Sarah Holder & Kriston Capps, The Push for
Denser Zoning Is Here to Stay, BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-21/to-tackle-housing-inequali
ty-try-upzoning; Andy Mannix, In Minneapolis, a Test Case for Cities Looking to
Solve Affordable Housing Crisis, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2019, 7:49 PM),
https://www.startribune.com/in-minneapolis-a-test-case-for-cities-looking-tosolve-affordable-housing-crisis/509165002/; Joe Cortright, Will Upzoning Ease
Housing Affordability Problems?, CITY OBSERVATORY: CITY COMMENTARY (May 15,
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Density advocates can point as well to research showing that
upzoning raises property values. 184 At the same time,
however, upzoning initiatives face resistance from local
residents who oppose development and from other, often
separate coalitions that are concerned about gentrification
and displacement. 185 The fate of local upzoning efforts vary
widely. While Minneapolis famously upzoned much of the
city in 2018, setting a new bar for other initiatives across the
country, activists in other cities have not yet realized the
same measure of success. 186
Upzoning thus might be politically viable in some
neighborhoods of a municipality but not in others. It might
enjoy city-wide support but face micro-local opposition on a
neighborhood by neighborhood basis, hampering the effort’s
political feasibility. 187 With these hyperlocal political
considerations in mind, commentators have advocated tying
upzoning and downzoning changes into packaged deals, for
example by requiring that a downzone in one neighborhood
be accompanied by denser zoning elsewhere. 188 Linking
2019), https://cityobservatory.org/will-upzoning-ease_affordability/.
184. See, e.g., Yonah Freemark, Upzoning Chicago: Impacts of a Zoning Reform
on Property Values and Housing Construction, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 758, 759 (2020);
see also Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Auctioning the Upzone, 70
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 513, 520–27 (2020) (discussing the economic value created
by upzoning).
185. See John Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, 72 FLA. L.
REV. 1271, 1283–84 (2020); Dan Wu & Sheila R. Foster, From Smart Cities to CoCities: Emerging Legal and Policy Responses to Urban Vacancy, 47 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 909, 929–30 (2020).
186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing Minneapolis);
Laura Bliss, The Last Days of SB50, California’s Doomed Upzoning Bill,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-01-30/california-sb50-upzoning-bill-has-one-last-chance; Philip Kiefer,
Seattle and Minneapolis: A Tale of Two Upzones, STREETS BLOG USA (May 21,
2019), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2019/05/21/seattle-and-minneapolis-a-tale-oftwo-upzones/.
187. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing NIMBYs and
neighborhood-level exclusion).
188. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning
Budget,” 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 81, 104–05 (2011) [hereinafter Hills &
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together these two divergent policy measures helps bind
current and future officials to the normative goal of zoning
reform. 189 The approach also gives those officials a
bargaining tool to employ when engaging with different
factions in the community.
Another perk to upzoning bargains—and to densification
measures more broadly—is an ability to boost property
reconfiguration efforts in the face of long-term decline. When
officials navigate between, and bargain with, competing local
factions on the question of zoning reform, the callable fee
simple can, and should, operate as another tool in the
municipal arsenal. Rather than merely seeking an
equilibrium between upzoning and downzoning measures
across a city, local officials can bring callable fees into the
mix. For example, if a sublocal community group is pushing
to downzone its neighborhood—or similarly, if the group is
resisting an upzoning proposal—the callable fee can serve as
both a carrot and stick at the negotiating table. 190 The
community group can get its desired outcome and ensure or
maintain a low-density zoning classification, but as part of
the resulting bargain the locality may instead zone that
neighborhood into a newly formed or enlarged FCD,
imposing a callable fee tenure upon the area. Meanwhile,
Schleicher, Zoning Budget]; Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning
an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 95 (2015) (arguing for binding
comprehensive plans that package together different zoning changes across
multiple neighborhoods, making them less likely disregarded by future piecemeal
considerations).
189. See Hills & Schleicher, Zoning Budget, supra note 188, at 104–05.
190. On the role of sublocal institutions in zoning, see, for example, Kenneth
A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 939, 999–1000 (2013) (discussing and promoting the role of sublocal
neighborhood institutions in the zoning process). Formal and informal sublocal
institutions play an important role in negotiating matters of local governance,
both in the realm of zoning and on other policy fronts. See Nestor M. Davidson &
David Fagundes, Law and Neighborhood Names, 72 VAND. L. REV. 757, 811
(2019); Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance,
82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 517 (1997); Stephen R. Miller, Legal Neighborhoods, 37
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 105, 107–08 (2013); Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA.
L. REV. 1323, 1336 (2014).
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upzoned or higher-density neighborhoods within the city
would not be subject to the same fate and would not be zoned
within an FCD. These tradeoffs can be justified on policy
grounds. Given that low-density uses generate more costs
when populations fall and that higher-density development
is more resistant and adaptive to demographic change, 191 a
zoning scheme embracing the former is likely prone to
accelerate, if not instigate, the cycles of decline. 192 Stated
otherwise, low-density zoning is arguably more justified
where it is accompanied by land tenure reform that
anticipates its adverse long-term consequences.
These bargains and decisions could occur piecemeal, in
response to zoning debates that emerge organically and with
the effect of gradually creating and expanding upon FCDs
over time. Better yet, however, localities could pursue the
approach first reinvigorated by Minneapolis and now being
advanced elsewhere: city-wide upzoning as an alternative to
incremental reform. Where neighborhood factions resist
these efforts, the callable fee simple can again serve as a
cudgel of political negotiation. Most boldly, local officials
could declare that the entire city will either be upzoned or
zoned into an FCD. This strategy could produce a couple
outcomes. On the one hand, if the trigger condition appears
remote and abstract, residents may discount the FCD
designation and care more to prevent densification, lending
political and legal credibility to the former. On the other
hand, where the trigger condition is more tangible or a
191. See supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between density, growth, and decline).
192. Research indicates that demographic decline affects rural and suburban
areas before affecting urban ones. See Fol & Cunningham-Sabot, supra note 42
(discussing urban growth in the face of national decline); see also Sano, supra
note 41 (“Although Japan’s total population has been dropping since 2009, capital
Tokyo has defied the trend, attracting young workers from all over the country.”).
These patterns are driven by a number of variables, however, and decisions to
upzone or downzone a given locality do not necessarily translate into the urbanrural divide seen in demographic data. For purposes of this Article, it is worth
noting that density is associated with the consequences of population decline,
regardless of whether it is a significant instigating cause.
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neighborhood is dominated by institutional owners,
upzoning may be viewed as the preferable outcome. Fewer
FCDs will be created, but the locality will be more
geographically consolidated, still enabling it to prepare for
decline.
In either event, upzoning helps address the key
operative questions posed above: the how, where, and why of
reforming tenure forms to implement a callable fee model. To
the first question, a callable fee model can be implemented
through zoning code reform that introduces the FCD as a
discrete zoning classification within the community. As
indicated above, a standalone zoning change that introduces
use and development sunset dates, even if tied to a far-off
trigger condition, might invite a Fifth Amendment takings
challenge. 193 Yet such a challenge could be rebutted on
several fronts. Precedent exists for making prospective
changes to property rights without implicating Fifth
Amendment property rights, 194 and here, by creating an FCD
that consciously does not impair property rights in the
present or near future, the local government leaves
untouched most of the sticks in the property bundle. The
government is not physically occupying the property or
completely depriving an owner of its use or value, either of
which would yield a less deferential judicial standard, but
rather causing an impairment short of complete
deprivation. 195 Indeed, arguably, the impairment being
contemplated is a particularly minimal and narrow one. It
193. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
194. See Fennell, supra note 114, at 1500 (discussing abolition of the fee tail);
Priest, Creating an American Property Law, supra note 115, at 441 (same);
Sprankling, supra note 119, at 765 (discussing nonconforming uses).
195. See Wolf, supra note 173, at 162–68 (describing the different Fifth
Amendment takings categories, assessed from the perspective of prospective
climate change regulation, and noting that Penn Central’s standard is most
deferential to the government (citing, among others, Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
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comes to pass only if a trigger condition arises in the future,
and even then, as envisioned above, residents could be given
an effective life estate to continue using their properties until
the FCD’s callblock becomes final, effectively modifying only
their property interest of intergenerational inheritability. 196
Viewed through the lens of a personhood or expectations
theory of property, these contingent, prospective, and
gradually implemented restraints should sit at the very edge
of our sense of private property rights. 197
A takings challenge becomes less formidable when a
callable fee is coupled with an upzoning initiative. In
practice, zoning reform to increase a neighborhood or city’s
density has not been viewed as a possible taking, 198 which
suggests equally that the threat or shadow of upzoning also
should not implicate Fifth Amendment rights. 199 Against
this backdrop, the callable fee simple can be advocated as a
compelling governmental tool. Where upzoning is opposed by
residents or disfavored by local stakeholders, the parallel
creation of an FCD is justifiable as a reasonable
counterbalance. If increased density mitigates against the
symptoms of population decline, then a neighborhood left
unchanged by this zoning reform—or indeed, a neighborhood
subject instead to downzoning and lower density
classifications—is more likely to generate public
externalities in the event of population decline and thus in
greater need of property reconfiguration. 200 The
196. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (discussing personhood
and expectations theories in property law); see also David A. Dana & Nadav
Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60 B.C. L. REV. 753, 761–62 (2019) (introducing and
applying “property edges theory”).
198. See Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
913, 923 (2016) (noting that upzoning “seldom raises takings problems”).
199. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE
L.J. 547, 554 (2001) (asking whether, and when, an upzoning might instead be
considered a “givings”).
200. Judicial review of these actions could apply the deferential regulatory
takings doctrine. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. But it could also be
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government’s justification will be no less acute on the
backend. In a scenario where the trigger condition has
occurred and all grace periods have terminated, the public’s
interest in consolidating development, services, and
infrastructure in lower density neighborhoods will be a
product of the now-established reality of decline.
In this manner, upzoning and density can also frame the
“where” of a callable fee model. Whether applied
incrementally or as part of a transformative, city-wide
zoning reform, establishing FCDs in low-density and lowerdensity sections of the city advances the aim of demographic
change preparedness. It adds a layer of adaptability atop the
otherwise static zoning code, in essence creating future
flexibility in the very places where municipal law anticipates
an oversupply of property to people. A focus on lower-density
neighborhoods further mitigates against equity concerns.
Higher-density zoning classifications are shown to promote
housing access and economic diversity, whereas lowerdensity classifications are associated with racial
homogeneity and exclusion. 201 This is not to say that density
challenged as an exaction under the murky unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
which is generally applied in the permitting context, but could, as some legal
commentators have feared, expand to other land use controls after Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013). See Timothy M.
Mulvaney, The State of Exactions, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 173 (2019) (noting
these concerns but finding that “Koontz’s footprint is thus far rather light”); see
also Randy J. Kozel, Leverage, 62 B.C. L. REV. 109, 124 (2021) (discussing the
“murky” doctrine); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Litigating Alternative Facts: School
Vaccine Mandates in the Courts, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 244 (2018) (same).
Even so, by coupling FCDs with lower-density zoning, local governments can
argue that an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” exist between the
conditions the former places on private owners and the public impacts posed by
the latter. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606 (the state cannot “pursue governmental
ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to [private]
impacts”). In the context of prospective climate change regulation, see Eagle,
supra note 37, at 752 (discussing climate change measures short of eminent
domain where the government provides a “modicum of environmental
justification or . . . permit[s] the owner to retain a modicum of benefit” (footnotes
omitted)).
201. A deep body of research has explored the connections between zoning
density, housing, diversity, and exclusion. See, e.g., Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas
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offers a perfect solution to these and other issues of
intergenerational displacement, considering that upzoning
can also cause discriminatory dislocations and when
evaluating the inequitable impacts of historical demographic
transitions. 202 But density offers a starting proxy.
Finally, ongoing debates over density and zoning—which
have already gained momentum and prominence—can be
used as a gateway for addressing future issues of population
decline that are more challenging to place within the public
consciousness and thus the crosshairs of local officials. Even
stakeholders who are unmoved by the prospect of long-term
population decline may find FCDs an appealing tool in the
debate over zoning reform. Likewise, those who see value in
preparing for demographic change can still couch their
position in the housing and development needs of today.
Stated otherwise, advocates can utilize the prevailing growth
machine ideology—one where increased density is needed for
S. Massey, The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial Segregation in U.S. Urban
Areas, 44 URB. AFFS. REV. 779, 780–82 (2009); Jonathan T. Rothwell, Racial
Enclaves and Density Zoning: The Institutionalized Segregation of Racial
Minorities in the United States, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 290, 291 (2011); Arthur
C. Nelson, Exclusionary Practices and Urban Sprawl in Metropolitan Atlanta, 17
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (2001); Michael B. de Leeuw et. al., The Current
State of Residential Segregation and Housing Discrimination: The United States’
Obligations Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 337, 363 (2008); Matthew
Resseger, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Racial Segregation: Evidence
from Massachusetts Zoning Borders 2 (Nov. 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/resseger/files/resseger_jmp_11_25.pdf; Michael
C. Lens & Paavo Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan
Areas More Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 6 (2016); Vanessa
Brown Calder, Zoning, Land‐Use Planning, and Housing Affordability, CATO
INST. 5 (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa823.pdf; Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of
Land Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265, 278
(2009); Arnab Chakraborty & Andrew McMillan, Is Housing Diversity Good for
Community Stability?: Evidence from the Housing Crisis, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH.,
Nov. 2, 2018, at 1, 2, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0739456X18810
787.
202. See Bradley Pough, Neighborhood Upzoning and Racial Displacement: A
Potential Target for Disparate Impact Litigation?, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE
267, 276–79 (2018); see also supra notes 48–54, 175 and accompanying text.
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future population gains—to prepare in lockstep for the other
side of the coin: a future where density gaps are a liability in
the face of population loss.
CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced a limited solution to a hazy yet
looming problem. The exact contours of future population
decline in the United States necessarily invite speculation,
as do all predictions about an embryonic era that might not
closely mirror our own. When will decline begin and then
accelerate, if ever? How will it be regionally dispersed? How
will the transformative changes of the coming decades and
centuries—spurred by automation, climate change, advances
in health and science, and other processes that have not yet
begun—exacerbate or temper the prospect of population
decline? These are questions we cannot answer today.
What can be said with some confidence, however, is that
significant demographic shifts, already well underway in a
number of the world’s largest economies, are likely on the
horizon for the United States, too. Whether or not these
predictions come to pass, traditional property law must
nevertheless become less static and more adaptive in the
Anthropogenic era. Local governance, meanwhile, must
move away from the growth machine model. No municipality
will truly grow forever, after all, and no private property
right is truly everlasting. 203 Temporal limits will ultimately
present themselves, as they have in the past. It is better to
prepare sooner rather than later for their arrival. With this
perspective in mind, this Article has proposed one
mechanism for challenging the gospel of growth and
promoting dynamism in local property law: introducing the
callable fee simple as a tenure form, aggregated as a
callblock within a neighborhood and zoned as a Future
203. See, e.g., Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World, supra note 117,
at 154 (describing conservation easements as “illusory” because it is “unrealistic
to assume that these conservation easements will actually be perpetual”).
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Contraction District.
Implementing and enforcing a callable fee does not
require public officials to recreate the wheel. Rather, the
model draws upon existing property law concepts, such as
Euclidean zoning and defeasible fee simples, that themselves
reflect property’s tension between its static and adaptive
natures. In doing so, however, the callable fee aims to
anticipate and embrace intergenerational adaptation in a
manner the traditional doctrines do not, a proactive
approach to the evolution of property law and the changing
private and public interests that inform it. Municipalities
that plan today will have more tools to face population
decline tomorrow. In the interim period, an FCD’s mere
presence in a community will also compel residents and
officials to view growth, decline, and intergenerational
planning in a different light—and, perhaps, even encourage
proactive reconfigurations to address other brewing
Anthropogenic challenges.

